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POWER INEQUITY AND THE REPATRIATION RIGHT IN THE NATIVE AMERICAN 
GRAVES PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION ACT 
 
 The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 sought to empower 
Native communities to reattain their ancestral human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and 
objects of cultural patrimony.  Issues both in theory and in practice have arisen in regard to the law 
and have made implementation difficult and controversial.  This paper seeks to analyze the power 
provided by the legislation and how it applied in the practice of compliance.  This power dynamic is 
then reconciled within the repatriation ethic of the United States as well as internationally.  As the 
scope broadens, an international repatriation ethic emerges that establishes repatriation of culturally 
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It seems an egregious injustice that this country had to develop a law to protect rights of 
some people that the rest of the people in the United States enjoyed as common law since their 
arrival.  It has always been illegal in this country to dig up graves or harbor bones without consent of 
Christian white folks in this country. For Native peoples within the United States, the same cannot 
be said.  The unveiling of this injustice and its lingering affects motivated my desire to “fight the 
good fight” in this field and defend the interests of the extreme minority of this country, but a 
minority science and academia leans on to a degree that it has at times seemingly found itself as the 
inheritor of Native culture and heritage more so than the Native peoples themselves. 
It is with this ardently Post-Colonial mentality that I took on the NAGPRA project at 
Colorado State University and that I began forging a path for my research.  At first, for both my 
work and my research, it was imperative to distance myself from ethnocentrism as much as possible 
and to absorb the knowledge, beliefs, and opinions of the Native peoples and their representatives 
in order to be hyper considerate during two processes that have often been drowned in insensitivity, 
anthropological work and NAGPRA consultations. 
I do however recognize some of the inherent problems with the Post-Colonial approach, as 
addressed by Linda Tuhiwai Smith in her book Decolonizing Methodologies.  The Post-Colonial 
approach, while recognizing the colonial aspects of research and academia, is also still colonial in 
that it affirms Western, academic power by utilizing a greater degree of cultural sensitivity in the 
research.  This sensitivity of Post-Colonialism theoretically makes this a more appealing approach to 
academia for me.  However, I try to be Post-Colonial in its truest form, by directing my comments 
to and from specifically my own epistemology and allowing those of a differing epistemology (i.e. 
Native Americans) to comment on their own epistemology.  
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For my mentorship on NAGPRA, I am deeply in debt to Sheila Goff and Bridget Ambler, 
of History Colorado, Jan Bernstein, of Bernstein & Associates, and especially Terry Knight and 
Lynn Hartman, of the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe.  The time outside of consultations I spent with 
Karen Little Coyote of the Southern Cheyenne and Bryan Montoya of the Pueblo of San Ildefonso 
were critical to my understanding of Native interests in their own heritage, as well as the many 
varied socio-political circumstances reservations and Native Americans find themselves in today. 
With their assistance, as well as numerous others, I came to find my professional path.  I also 
came to understand what my research must be about, despite my initial impression that I would be a 
conventional cultural anthropologist studying Native culture and processes and reporting back to the 
rest of the world my own interpretation.  I found this to be distasteful, and my relationships with all 
the people that were a part of my “research” were in fact teaching and mentoring me the entire time.  
In this way I hoped to utilize my experience to highlight the problems that applications of the law 
inspire – both from a practical and a philosophical perspective. 
Notable aspects of my sensitivity mentorship have been included in this paper.  For the 
purposes of referring to the human remains in CSU’s collection, I use the term that is preferred by 
the tribes that I have consulted with: individuals.  When the term “individuals” is used in this paper, 
it will always be referring to human remains, not currently breathing people.  I also use the term 
Native as a shorthand way of specifically referring to Native Americans.  At no point will a 
capitalized “Natives” refer to anything other than Native Americans.  The term “indigenous” is used 
for all native peoples and is used for geographically or culturally specific indigenous peoples outside 
the United States.  In places which more specificity is needed, the most generally accepted scholastic 
terms will be used for indigenous peoples (i.e. Maori, First Nations, Australian indigenous, etc.) 
In this way, this paper has become less of a conventional cultural anthropology study and 
more of a legal anthropology review with a reconciliation of broader trends in repatriation to the 
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practice in the United States.  It is by this process that I hope to advocate many of my friends and 
colleagues.  The fact of the matter is that the issues that NAGPRA addresses are not a national 
priority.  However, in many ways NAGPRA is thought of as a comprehensive, be-all-end-all 
legislation on cultural heritage and repatriation.  If we are striving toward genuine equality in this 
country then we must constantly be reconsidering what equality currently means and what we are 
doing to fight for it.  This paper is my part – for now.  Ask yourself, what need was NAGPRA 
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 As NAGPRA (Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act) Coordinator for 
Colorado State University (CSU), I had the opportunity to participate in consultations with tribal 
representatives from tribes that at some point had settled in northern Colorado.  The second of 
these consultations I hosted and led.  I welcomed traditional religious leaders, elders, and tribal 
heritage experts as official government representatives of their respective tribes.  These 
representatives came to Fort Collins, Colorado from Wyoming, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arizona, 
and southwestern Colorado. 
 They came to Fort Collins to consult on 78 individuals who were indicated or likely to be 
from Colorado and Arizona (there was one additional individual at the university that was most 
likely Californian which meant there were 79 total individuals at CSU).  Colorado State University 
had acquired these remains mostly through donations and salvage archaeology projects on private 
land.  The Front Range of Colorado is notorious for its swift erosion, which exposes many 
archaeological resources.  Unfortunately for these tribal representatives, it also exposes many 
humans’ remains who were never intended to be uncovered, let alone removed, from their resting 
places. 
 These religious leaders, elders, and heritage experts sat down together at a table within a 
building on Colorado State University’s campus.  Many of them had worked together in the past and 
had strong relationships.  I was meeting most of them for the first time.  According to NAGPRA 
and the university’s policy, they were there to help me determine whether or not any of the 
individuals could be culturally affiliated to one of the tribes.  Throughout the consultation, I 
presented them the information we had in regard to these individuals and asked them for any 
insights on what might indicate a shared culture between the present day tribes and the individuals.  
2 
 
Case after case I presented and at points I received feedback that might be used to indicate cultural 
affiliation, but mostly there was very little information on the individuals.  In fact 50 of them had no 
provenience whatsoever.  After beginning with the individuals with provenience, we began to look 
through all the individuals without provenience.  Because there were no claims of cultural affiliation 
at any point, it was agreed that 77 individuals – representing all the individuals with provenience in 
Colorado – of the 78 should be considered “culturally unidentifiable” and repatriated to one of the 
tribes represented at the meeting.  The other individual would go to another represented tribe whose 
land it was apparently from. 
 Cultural affiliation is the main reason why consultation is conducted.  It is mandated within 
NAGPRA that potentially affiliated tribes have an opportunity to review the remains and associated 
artifacts in order to determine whether or not they are related to them.  The definition of tribes both 
NAGPRA and this paper uses is those self-defined cultures of indigenous peoples of the United 
States.  By requiring consultation with the tribes in the affiliation process, tribal representatives have 
the opportunity to make claims for their apparent ancestors.  This process is typical of burial 
common law in which the next of kin receive the responsibility over the corpse in order to assure 
expedient and proper burial. 
 This resolution to qualify all the human remains as “culturally unidentifiable” was reached 
shortly after I offered it.  The solution may have come up naturally, as it was the most obvious.  It 
was the priority of the tribes to have the individuals most expediently reburied by whoever had the 
resources (mostly time).  By labeling the individuals as culturally unidentifiable, there would be fewer 
Notices of Inventory Completion, fewer Transfer of Control documents, and much less paperwork 
in general.  This would theoretically expedite reburials for the remains. 
  This was a moment that deeply affected me.  Here was a room of very important 
government representatives who were collaborating to dictate the future of 78 human remains and 
3 
 
so much of the power in the room seemed to be situated in my own hands.  I had the power of 
invitation to this consultation.  As a representative of the institutions that is really empowered by 
law, I ultimately was deferred the power to make cultural affiliation determinations.  I had the power 
to determine what would happen to these human remains, none of which am I related to or have 
any right to govern, regardless of the tribal representatives’ interests.  That is not to say that the 
tribes could not sue CSU for my decision, and they likely would if I acted against their interests, 
however litigation is expensive.  It would have taken significant tribal resources to appeal a decision 
not made in their best interest and ultimately the appeal may or may not be successful. 
 Regardless of my personal policy of allowing the tribes to dictate the process, the fact that I 
am the inherent power bottleneck got me thinking.  Was I meant to be empowered by NAGPRA?  
Is NAGPRA accomplishing its intent?  Who is meant to have the power in the process?  Who can 
actually utilize whatever power it issues?  These are the questions that guide this paper and my 
research has been a process of uncovering what repatriation means and how it operates in the local, 
national, and international context.  
 I became interested in NAGPRA as a museum intern at the Fort Collins Museum.  In this 
position, I learned about the law and how it had been operationalized at the museum.  Later I came 
to realize how revolutionary their approach had been.  In 2002, they led consultations to determine 
cultural affiliation, as well as to develop reburial plans for both culturally affiliated and culturally 
“unidentifiable” individuals (Martin 2004).  In 2006, and long before the 2010 culturally 
unidentifiable (CUI) regulation was promulgated, both affiliated and “unidentifiable” individuals 
were reburied (National Park Service 2006).  At this time, reburials of these “unidentifiable” remains 
were very rare and controversial (Colwell-Chanthaphonh 2010; Liebmann and Rizvi 2008; Watkins 
2004).  Learning about the Fort Collins Museum policy the year prior to 2010 “CUI” regulation 
publishing drove my passion.  Especially in tracking the controversy surrounding the 2010 
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regulation, I found myself fixated on what seemed to be the overarching question: what should be 
done with these Native remains? 
 It seemed to me that there must be an answer to this question, and that the answer must be 
sympathetic to Native interests.  I did not understand what right archaeologists and museum 
professionals thought they had to retain skulls and assorted body part of deceased Natives.  It was in 
light of these concerns that I decided to pursue graduate studies.  It just so happened that Colorado 
State University was both looking for graduate students and help on their NAGPRA project. 
 At CSU, the supervisors over the NAGPRA project asked me to put together a consultation 
in order to finalize their initial inventory.  Funds for the project had just been provided by the 
College of Liberal Arts and were seemingly more than enough to complete the project.  I 
coordinated this consultation, and originally had 18 tribes RSVP for the event.  After making several 
follow-up calls, 12 had confirmed they would be there the next week and an additional 4 had 
RSVP’d but I was unable to contact them in the weeks leading up to the event.  On the first day of 
this initial consultation effort, only three tribes were present.  The geographic expanse these three 
tribes only represented the area of 2 of our individuals.  Accordingly, we could only consult on 2 of 
the 78 and get general consensus on the approach for any individuals without provenience.  To me 
and others at CSU, the consultation was a massive disappointment and a tremendous waste of 
CSU’s resources, although we were able to secure a request for repatriation of one individual from 
one of the represented tribes. 
 Afterwards, I coordinated a follow-up consultation meant to address the remaining 77 
individuals.  The inclusion of tribes from the areas around Fort Collins and areas that some of the 
individuals were apparently from was critical.  Because of this, the consultation was completely 
planned around the schedules of the tribes.  Unfortunately this meant that it had to take place during 
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CSU’s spring break, when most of the faculty is away at conferences or otherwise travelling.  The 
consultation, at the acquiescence of the tribal representatives, was led by me. 
 As I mentioned above, this consultation was very productive and a tentative plan for the 77 
individuals was forged.  The plan previously developed for the individual claimed during the first 
consultation was also approved by this second group.  Since then, I have presented a plan of 
disposition for individuals without provenience to the National NAGPRA review committee, 
published Notices of Inventory Completion, developed and completed Transfers of Control, and I 
am currently working on finalizing disposition/repatriation and reburial plans for these individuals 
as I am writing this paper. 
 Throughout this work, ethical issues have paralyzed me periodically.  Going into the first 
consultation, I spoke with one of the representatives that had RSVP’d.  She said, “You should know, 
less than half of the tribes that RSVP’d will be there.”  Due to my optimism and what I believed to 
be sufficient persistence (and borderline annoyance) in securing commitments to attend, I did not 
take her seriously.  However, she could not have been more accurate.  To my mind however, this 
was meant to benefit the tribes and CSU paying expenses.  The way I saw it, all I needed was their 
time in order to do something good for the people and the remains.  Why was it that so few would 
show up despite it seeming from a museum standpoint to be an easy project for the tribes? 
 The second consultation brought two more significant ethical issues to my attention.  On 
one hand was my awakening to the power disparity in the room regarding these remains.  On the 
other hand was the issue of using NAGPRA as a tool by which Native purposes could be achieved 
regardless of the intent or purpose of the law.  Specifically, the tribes agreed that cultural affiliation – 
one of the highest priorities of NAGPRA – was not a priority of the consultation.  The top priority 
of the consultation for the tribes was to determine the most effective and expedient plan for reburial 
of all the remains – preferably as near to where they were exhumed as possible.  Because the tribes 
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all agreed on this point, the determination was made to label the remains as “culturally 
unidentifiable” with the intent to keep them all together to be repatriated and reburied by one tribe.  
Especially considering this in terms of the interests of the deceased, this seemed problematic. 
 Some of the remains had provenience and evidence that might have been sufficient to 
indicate cultural affiliation.  According to NAGPRA, this evidence is to be utilized in a 
determination of whether or not the remains could be culturally affiliated, and if so to identify that 
modern tribe.  In accordance with the wishes and interests of the tribes, this evidence was largely 
disregarded in order to determine a plan of reburial.  As an advocate for the tribes, I was content to 
acquiesce to their determinations in the consultation.  However, as a NAGPRA Coordinator and an 
anthropologist, the ethics of disregarding the legal process supposedly meant to lead to equitable 
disposition of NAGPRA material and information to tribes was somewhat problematic. 
 In order to better understand my position on these matters, I began to investigate the causes 
for these issues.  As an anthropologist – and student of Kathy Pickering – I began my understanding 
of the issue from a Constructivist approach (Ross et all 27-54).  This approach acknowledges that 
our understanding of the world around us results from historical constructs.  That is to say any 
individuals’ or groups’ worldview is dictated by the culture they are raised in, and that culture is a 
construct of its distinct history (Agrawal 1995; Gegeo and Watson-Gegeo 2001; Kuper et al. 2003; 
Ross 2008).  This approach recognizes the distinctly different epistemologies – a collective system of 
knowledge and ways of knowing – of different cultures.  Native Americans of the United States are 
raised within systems that still integrate varying degrees of traditional knowledge and lifeways 
alongside Western systems and knowledge.  In this way, Native epistemologies will significantly 
differ from those of specifically Western epistemologies.  By using this approach, I have tried to 
ground any understanding of the law, its intent, and its function as firmly entrenched within the 
Western, Judeo-Christian American epistemology.   
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 Analyzing this Western epistemology and its effects on the repatriation process was 
particularly meaningful to me after my awakening during the second consultation.  Not only was I 
put off by the power inequity, but of my role in a colonialist system that forced my actions to be 
implicitly colonialist.  It was clear to me that based on my own ontology having been formed within 
the constructs of Western history.  I must appreciate the restraints these constructs have created for 
me, as well as my inability to operate within a separate construct I am sympathetic to but not raised 
within.  For this reason, my research focused on power as utilized by those of my shared 
epistemology and the effects of that use of power. 
 In evaluating the mutual influences of culture, indigenousness, and epistemology, each must 
first be defined.  The definition of culture in this paper generally follows Tylor’s original definition 
from Popular Science Monthly in 1884: 
“…that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any 
other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.”  Indigenousness is 
notoriously difficult to define and this difficulty has inspired many political problems for 
those collectively classified as “indigenous.”   
 
For this paper, the term indigenous refers to groups of people and communities that have a history 
of occupancy prior to a colonial power and has been subject to a dominating colonial power which 
has lasting repercussions today.  To situate indigenous and Western constructions, we also must 
define the crucial concept of epistemology.  By this, the paper refers to knowledge systems and 
constructs as determined and reinforced by a group’s environment and history.  Understanding my 
use of these three terms is important in understanding both my approach and the point of my 
analysis. 
 This paper traces my discovery of the written intent of the legislation and the actual practice 
of the law.  By doing so, my hope is to illuminate deficiencies in the law as well as to indicate the 
broader trends in repatriation that may render NAGPRA outdated.  How will repatriation operate 
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moving into the future?  How will people in the future view the repatriation efforts of the present?  
These questions are critical to understand what should be done in the now.   
 Chapter 2 begins by parsing out the Constructivist approach and how it can be applied to 
repatriation.  It then digs into the history of repatriation and its rise in the United States, looking at 
Native and scholarly calls for legislation and the first precedents for such a law.  A short section of 
this chapter will be devoted to the legislative history, which was explored in depth by Timothy 
McKeown in his recent book (McKeown 2012).  By evaluating this history we can discern some 
basic tenets of intent.  This gives us our measuring stick for the next chapter. 
 Chapter 3 starts with a look at the glaring holes in the legislation and how they were 
addressed with regulations.  Whether or not these regulations were in keeping with the intent is 
subject to debate, however the measuring stick of intent developed in Chapter 2 can be used to 
evaluate these claims.  Then follows a look at what NAGPRA actually accomplishes in practice 
relative to this intent.  It becomes clear that there are many significant issues that NAGPRA 
insufficiently addresses.  This critical look at the law will be guided by our measuring stick of intent. 
 Chapter 4 takes a look at repatriation trends globally.  These trends help illuminate the state 
of repatriation in the United States.  We will also notice trends that give strong indication of the 
future of repatriation and perhaps at one point its normalized status as a “human right.”  The 
concept of a human right will be analyzed and its application to indigenous peoples of the world will 
be scrutinized.  Finally the last section is a look back at NAGPRA from the future, approximately 50 
years from now, exposing some of the jarring problems of the law and its practice in our modern 
context. 
 The intent of this paper is to give guidance on the ethical issues that NAGPRA inherently 
presents.  By developing this guidance, broader trends in practice and normalization will be exposed 
that demonstrate that there is a “right” and “wrong” side of history on this issue.  If indigenous 
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peoples of the world utilize the concept of human rights and repatriation becomes normalized as a 
human right, as I indicate, then those in the United States and elsewhere acting contrary to what is 








In order to determine whether or not NAGPRA is effective, the need for NAGPRA must 
first be determined and then the intent of NAGPRA must be discerned.  If repatriation were 
unnecessary and unwanted, the law would also be unnecessary and unwanted.  If it can be 
demonstrated that it was warranted, then the approach of legislators can then be measured in a 
couple different ways.  First, the intent of the legislation can be measured against the actual practice 
of the dictates of the legislation.  This measurement will be the focus of Chapter 2.  Second, the 
legislation itself can be measured against the national and international repatriation ethics 
throughout the world, which will be the focus of Chapter 3.  This chapter will set the basis for each 
of these discussions by looking at the development of the repatriation ethic and NAGPRA 
legislation in the United States. 
Any discussion that involves federal Indian law and policy should begin and end with 
acknowledgement of the epistemological differences between the culture dictating the policy and the 
people subject to the policy.  Of course, speaking in universal terms for all Natives of the United 
States, the boundaries of which are Western constructions, and their supposedly collective way of 
knowing is a tendency of the Western epistemology in and of itself.  In consideration of that fact, 
the discussion will focus on the Western epistemology and how and why this shared system of 
thought and knowing is not a part of the ontology of the indigenous peoples of the United States.   
 The constructivist approach to understanding the differences in ways of knowing 
acknowledges that each culture or group’s shared knowledge is a result of its unique history and 
individuals (Agrawal 1995; Ross et al. 27-54 ).  Each group has a unique system and interpretation in 
understanding the world around them.  Many groups share very many similarities in their 
interpretation of the world and those people often have a shared culture, with an overarching shared 
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epistemology.  However, subcultures within the larger culture also include sub-epistemologies within 
the larger epistemology (Myhre 2006).  This epistemology tree has parallels to the way we 
understand language.  Although we do not see any particular modern languages as “parent” 
languages of its contemporaries, we see their influences on each other and their shared roots (Myhre 
2006). 
 In this way we can see many similarities in the priority of supposedly value-neutral, scientific 
knowledge in Europe, the United States, and Canada.  However, subcultures with a shared 
overarching ontology differ from group to group.  Consider the limits that groups put on scientific 
knowledge.  Within the United States, there are a vast amount of people that believe, contrary to 
scientific evidence, that the world was created by the Christian God approximately 6,000 years ago 
and that a great flood wiped out the dinosaurs that had previously lived alongside humans 
(answersingenesis.org 2014).  Scientific evidence puts the creation of the world billions of years prior 
to that and the extinction of dinosaurs millions of years prior to the first humans 
(answersingenesis.org 2014).  In Ukraine and Russia, many people refuse to use ice in their 
beverages or even eat ice cream cold (Moscowmom 2007; Simone 2011).  Modern reasoning for this 
varies, though the most popular answer seems to be that the cold would make you sick 
(Moscowmom 2007).  This also does not seem to be grounded in modern Western scientific 
understanding. 
 These differences are not unexpected but are meant to highlight the varying degrees of 
investment in the universalizing ideology of scientific secularism by different groups.  The central 
tenets of this ideology are shared throughout these regions, however peculiarities still exist that 
contradict the ideology as a whole.  This demonstrates two things.  First, there is still inherent 
resistance to these concepts coming from people that have seemingly subscribe to this system of 
knowing.  Westerners raised within this epistemology have a colonialist tendency to think that once 
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everyone is “civilized” everyone will share this scientific secular ideology (Matthews and Jordan 
2011), however regional and cultural resistance may indicate otherwise. 
 In fact, if you consider the world economy system and its two central tenets of capitalism 
and scientific secularism (Matthews and Jordan 2011) and how it has been applied on the world 
stage today, it becomes obvious that the more diverse the epistemology the more resistance there is 
to the universalizing world economy system.  Even major world powers like Russia and China have 
not adopted this system in its entirety due to their own priorities that are likely born from their own 
epistemologies that still co-exist with the Western epistemology in their countries.  Because of this, 
varying degrees of capitalism and scientific secularism have been adopted throughout the world.  
The financial incentives for working within this system are very significant, however people with 
inherently contrasting ideologies have seemingly struggled to adopt these Western systems and their 
epistemology (Maffie 2005). 
 The second thing that regional distinctions in a shared overarching epistemology indicate is 
sub-epistemologies within larger shared epistemologies.  On one hand, the Native peoples in the 
United States have adopted a shared, universal culture and epistemology in collaboratively operating 
through the National Congress of American Indians, Native American Rights Fund, American 
Indian Movement and other groups formed in the Red Power Movement.  On the other hand, there 
are currently 566 federally-recognized tribes that are their own sovereign nations within the United 
States (Bureau of Indian Affairs 2012).  Of these tribes, at least 325 live on their own reservation 
lands and there are about 169 distinct languages spoken amongst all of them (Siebens and Julian 
2010; U.S. Census Bureau 2013).  The diversity of groups and the lack of shared culture between 
them certainly indicate that there are nearly as many epistemologies as there are federally-recognized 
tribes in Indian Country of the United States.  However, it is clear that these groups have very little 
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political power or influence and they must rely upon universalizing organizations and movements 
for representation. 
 The differing epistemologies can even be seen in repatriation ethics of individual tribes.  
Some groups, like that Navajo, Zuni, and Eastern Shoshone have been reticent to have human 
remains repatriated and reburied on their reservations, due to religious beliefs.  For each group, the 
religious justification is unique, as are the interests of every separate tribe involved in repatriation 
consultation.  Each of these tribal epistemologies are certainly different than the Western, scientific 
secular epistemology.  This is key in evaluating the interests of the tribes and the interests of the 
government and where those worlds meet: federal Indian law and policy.  NAGPRA is certainly a 
part of Indian Law and can be seen as a model of the problems that differences in epistemologies 
and the ignorance of these differences cause. 
 
Genesis of the Repatriation Debate 
 The origins of the contemporary power dynamic began as the colonies were formed in the 
current United States.  The capitalist ideologies that the European colonists brought with them 
created a perfect storm of destruction and oppression of the natural environment and Native 
communities (Wallerstein 191-256).  In fact capitalism and colonialism paralleled each other in 
development out of the Middle Ages (see also Wallerstein 1989).  As capital was created that could 
fund colonial expeditions and new territories, the rewards of colonialism and the subsequent 
resource extraction from those colonies generated new capital.  The capital generated from 
colonialism translated to European nation-state wealth and power, which only further subjected 
people indigenous the colonial territories to gross injustices. 
 This political economy understanding of the development of power in the United States and 
other former European colonies demonstrates how a paradigm of inherent racism was instituted.  
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The indigenous peoples of the colonies were not interested in the capitalistic endeavors and typically 
had less expansive and complex economic systems.  Accordingly, the capitalist system incentivized 
manipulation of the indigenous resources and relegating indigenous peoples to a lower class. 
It is within this context that Anthropology began in the United States.  These fields arose as 
a means within the emerging scientific secular ideology that justified colonialism as well as a form of 
Manifest Destiny.  The earliest efforts sought to uncover the assumedly non-Native origins of the 
Moundbuilders, record dying cultures, and to demonstrate the inherent inferiority of Native peoples 
via phrenology. 
 One of the earliest and most meticulous of early, amateur archaeologists in the United States 
was Thomas Jefferson.  Interested in the Moundbuilders of eastern and central US, Jefferson 
conducted meticulous and thorough excavations of the mounds (Hurst Thomas 2000a; Trigger 
2006).  At the time, theories as to the builders of the mounds ranged from Aztecs to Welshmen 
(Trigger 2006).  Very few people thought that the contemporary Native peoples of the United States 
could be descendants of the Moundbuilders as the mounds seemingly represented a point on the 
cultural evolutionary scale that was beyond the people living at the time (Hurst Thomas 2000a; 
Trigger 2006).  These racist, though often well-intentioned, narratives were partly dispelled by 
Jefferson and later by other archaeologists that could not draw a connection between the mounds 
and any other peoples than the contemporary Native peoples of the surrounding areas (Hurst 
Thomas 2000a).  
 Shortly after the height of the Moundbuilder discourse, Social Darwinism became very 
popular in the mid-to-late 19th century.  This concept, largely advocated by sociologist Herbert 
Spencer1, indicated that there were more and less evolved cultures that are all on the same trajectory 
                                                 
1
 Spencer also coined the phrase “survival of the fittest” which though often attributed as an aspect of Darwinism is 
actually a separate concept; in this way Spencer’s evolution was based on inherent superiority of the surviving and 
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towards what Westerners considered “modern civilization” (Claeys 2000).  The evolution could be 
scaled from the “primitive” nomads of central Africa to the highly sophisticated peoples of Western 
Europe (Claeys 2000).  This overtly implied superiority of the people of Western European ancestry 
over all other peoples, and even scaled how much “more advanced” they were than each kind of 
peoples (Claeys 2000; Ross et al. 2010; Trigger 2006). 
This school of thought was fueled by the contemporaneous phrenology movement that 
purported to understand cultural, and even individual, tendencies based on the size and shape of 
skulls (Bieder 2000; Fine-Dare 2002a; Hurst Thomas 2000b; Trope 2013).  World renowned 
anthropologist Samuel Morton began the practice of collecting Native human remains, and most 
importantly skulls.  Known by many as the father of biological anthropology (Bieder 2000; Fine-
Dare 2002b; Hurst Thomas 2000b), Morton became famous for his “American School” of 
anthropology that used the measurements of the skull to discern mental capacity for such things as 
law, spirituality, and morality (Bieder 2000; Hurst Thomas 2000b).  Though veiled as an honest 
scientific pursuit, the conclusions made by phrenologists reflected the racism prevalent at the time 
surmising that “the general size [of Native heads] is greatly inferior to that of the average European 
head; indicating inferiority in natural mental power” (Trope 2013).  Morton and his American 
School concluded that Anglo-Saxons and Teutons had the most mental capacity and that both 
African-Americans and Native Americans were naturally meant to be enslaved or terminated by the 
European stock (Hurst Thomas 2000b). 
                                                                                                                                                             
thriving populations whereas Darwin’s concepts were purely based on advantageous adaptations; Spencer’s 
concepts were a huge factor in the eugenics movements of the late 18
th






The phenomenon of phrenology in American academia generated an industry for skull 
collecting on a scale that had never occurred before (Fine-Dare 2002a; Hurst Thomas 2000b; Trope 
2013).  Even Morton himself was surprised by the shortage of legal specimens.  In a 1830 lecture to 
medical students, a baffled Morton exclaimed, “Strange to say, I could neither buy nor borrow a 
cranium of each of these races” (Hurst Thomas 2000b).  Facing the lack of potential data, Morton 
and other phrenologists began collecting skulls both legally and illegally.   One visitor was impressed 
Figure 1 - Phrenology behavioral diagram from People's Cyclopedia of Universal Knowledge (1883) 
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with Morton’s collection of about 600 skulls in 1846, and before his death in 1851, it was estimated 
that Morton alone had approximately 1,000 skulls in his personal collection (Hurst Thomas 2000b). 
This fervor for skulls rippled across the United States, and the majority of those held by 
academics of the American School were those of Native Americans (Hurst Thomas 2000b).  In fact 
in 1867, the Surgeon General ordered that military collect crania to send to the Army Medical 
Museum which was “forming this collection to aid in the progress of anthropological science by 
obtaining measurements of a large number of skulls of the aboriginal races of North America” 
(Fine-Dare 2002a).  This practice continued throughout the rest of the 19th century and into the 20th 
century when in 1903 Aleš Hrdlička became the first curator of physical anthropology at what is 
now the Smithsonian Institution National Museum of Natural History (McKeown 2012; Mihesuah 
2000).  There, he arranged for the transfer of over 4,500 skulls, as well as other human remains, 
collected by the Army Medical Museum to the Smithsonian (Mihesuah 2000). 
It is through this sordid history that the first and largest collections of Native American 
human remains were assembled.  Remains of white people were also collected and studied, and 
sometimes illegally, during this period (Hurst Thomas 2000b), however much more stringent laws 
and better protected burials kept grave robbers and collectors focused on Native human remains 
(Fine-Dare 2002a; Hurst Thomas 2000b).  These large collections, already well established by the 
early 20th century in most academically prestigious institutions (Hurst Thomas 2000b), only 
normalized the concept of collecting non-white human remains.  Throughout the 20th century, 
archaeological praxis demanded the collection and study of Native remains found in excavations.  At 
the same time, human remains of white peoples were always reinterred, usually as quickly as possible 
(Zimmerman 1989). 
This history normalized an astonishing double standard in the United States: white remains 
when found were to be reinterred and Native remains when found were to be collected and studied.  
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Prior to NAGPRA, this double standard was recognized by both Native peoples and academics alike 
(Rosen 1980; Zimmerman 1989b; Zimmerman 1989a; Zimmerman 1986).  It was clear that 
common law burial rights were not being applied to Native peoples in the United States (Pendleton 
2003; Rosen 1980).  Some people began calling for the empowerment of Native communities to 
regain their ancestors – as well as the other sacred objects taken throughout the period of the Indian 
Wars.   
 
Common Burial and Property Law 
 Burials rights are a part of English common law as applies to the US law system through a 
reception statute enacted at the creation of the United States as an independent nation.  This means 
that the legal precedents of English common law prior to the establishment of the United States 
government would apply in United States courts.  This burial common law gives “quasi-property” 
designation to the deceased for the purposes of affording next of kin control over the remains.  
However, they are not truly property in that burial law also dictates the deceased has a right to a 
decent and expedient burial, and those with quasi-property rights over the remains cannot act 
contrary to that right for the deceased.  Common law also assures the release of any kind of next-of-
kin quasi-property rights upon the interment of an individual into the ground, at which point they 
become a part of the land (West's Encyclopedia of American Law 2008)   
 It became clear, however, that this common law did not apply to unmarked Native American 
burials.  According the ruling in the 1982 case Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc., these 
unmarked Native American burials were not subject to burial common law due to these burials likely 
predating the establishment of that set of laws in the United States.  Accordingly, Native American 
burials could be excavated, robbed, or obliterated without any significant consequence (see also 
Echo-Hawk and Trope 2000; Hutt and McKeown 1999). 
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Early Recognition of the Problem 
 As early as 1938, a repatriation claim for objects that would later be covered by NAGPRA 
was made and won by the Hidatsa for a medicine bundle that had been collected by George Heye 
(NMAI 2014).  Heye spent decades amassing the largest collection of Native American materials, 
including human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony – the latter 
defined as items that were of such importance to the tribe collectively that they could not be 
individually owned.  Heye’s collection did not include many human remains or funerary objects 
relative to many of the contemporary mortuary collection, although he did specifically seek sacred 
objects and objects of cultural patrimony (NMAI 2014).  His collection still today represents the 
majority of the holdings in the National Museum of the American Indian, as will be detailed later. 
 Ever the collector, Heye agreed to repatriate the medicine bundle to the Hidatsa, whose 
representatives travelled from the Great Plains to New York City, in exchange for other artifacts.  
The Hidatsa agreed to exchange a powder horn and war club for the sacred objects.  Although this 
was not repatriation in its truest sense, it did represent a very early appreciation for Native interests – 
and in some cases, their needs – regarding their material heritage (NMAI 2014). 
Nearly half a decade later, in 1971, a faculty member in the Anthropology Department at 
Colorado State University excavated three individuals that had apparently been buried in a crevice 
along the Front Range of Colorado (78 FR 72706).  These individuals were brought back to CSU to 
be analyzed and studied, however there was some controversy in the socially charged atmosphere of 
the early 70’s.  The Denver chapter of the American Indian Movement, led by Clyde Bellecourt, 
occupied the Anthropology Department and took most of the remains of these three individuals, 
including much of the teaching collection of bones (Goldstein 2011; Johnson 1996; McGuire 2008).  
Bellecourt demanded the return of the rest of the Native human remains held by the university as 
well as the cessation of excavations of Native remains (Johnson 1996).  The university did not 
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acquiesce to either of these demands and many individuals were excavated by CSU in the 
subsequent years. 
A couple years prior, in 1969, Red Power activist Vine Deloria, Jr. published his renowned 
book Custer Died for your Sins: An Indian Manifesto (Deloria, Jr. 1969).  In this book, Deloria criticized 
anthropologists’ claimed scientific objectivity and pointed out that their work was both a result and 
creator of racism.  He and other Red Power activists, such as those that occupied CSU, called for 
anthropology to return ancestors and quit unapproved excavations (Deloria, Jr. 1969).  Their 
occupations of archaeological sites, artifact repositories, and disputed land made national headlines 
and prompted governmental response, including new laws and an FBI standoff at Wounded Knee 
(Biolsi and Zimmerman 1997; Hurst Thomas 2000c).  However, the response of mainstream 
anthropology was much the same as CSU’s: silence. 
A constructivist approach to understanding this situation starts with the contrasting 
epistemologies.  On one hand, there was a collection of minority epistemologies that were projected 
upon by the majority epistemology.  This majority epistemology was at the same time oppressive 
and unapologetic to the minority epistemology while at the same time staying dismissive of calls for 
recognition of Native interests.  This oppression could be explained by cultural Marxism, in which 
the dominant culture is incentivized to maintain the oppressive paradigm against the cultural 
minority (Habermas 1985; Kellner 2004).  In this case, scientists from the dominant culture, 
representing the majority of the population, political power, and wealth were capitalizing on finding 
and studying Native heritage.  Although Natives have a strong common law (Hutt and McKeown 
1999) claim for their heritage, the claims are largely dismissed due to the oppressive system which 
advocates its own culture.  During the Red Power Movement, Native advocates sought to change 
this paradigm and realize better and more accountable representation for Native interests in the 
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media and politics.  This movement largely set the stage for a sympathetic group of mainstream 
anthropologists and politicians to make change (Biolsi and Zimmerman 1997). 
Despite the isolated fervor coming from Native communities and their advocates, not many 
requests for repatriation seem to have been made prior to NAGPRA (Echo-Hawk and Trope 2000; 
Fine-Dare 2002b; Trope 2013).  Certainly not enough had been made to naturalize repatriation 
processes for museums that held Native human remains and sacred objects.  No doubt, the 20th 
century was a time of adaptation and change for Native peoples in the face of oppressive and 
disinterested governance, and repatriation oftentimes was not within the scope or priorities of tribal 
governments.  It wasn’t until 1980 that an anthropologist, sympathetic to the rising volume of 
Native disapproval with museum and archaeological practice, proposed a policy of repatriation in 
academia.  From this point, the topic began to snowball until 10 years later when federal legislation 
mandating repatriation was promulgated by the United States government. 
 This anthropologist was Lawrence Rosen, a legal anthropologist at Princeton University.  
His proposal set forth three plans based on two criteria: whether or not remains were found on 
reservations and whether the remains could be considered “recent” or “ancient” (Rosen 1980).  
Rosen situated repatriation within burial common law, which also standardizes rights of disinterment 
– often occurring in cases which post-burial autopsies must be performed.  In accordance with 
common law, he determined that for individuals found on reservation land, the tribe(s) on whose 
land it was found should be the sole possessor of the individuals.  This determination was purely 
based on contemporary property and sovereignty rights of the tribes and did not take into 
consideration potential cultural affiliation or the age of remains. 
 For those remains found off reservation lands, Rosen proposed two courses of action 




“reason to believe that the remains are those of an identifiable tribal group that presently 
exists, or where the remains are in an area to which a contemporary tribe has historic ties, 
after the relationship has been demonstrated through an appropriate hearing, the Indians 
should be accorded control over the remains” (Rosen 1980). 
 
For Rosen, the burden of the proof, as well as the initial request for repatriation is an obligation of 
the interested tribe.  He also outlined “probable relationship” as the necessary demonstration for 
repatriation.  The determinations were to be made by a regional court to an administrative law judge 
with the potential help of a “master – an expert in the field of archaeology – to advise him” (Rosen 
1980). 
 For “ancient” remains found off-reservation, Rosen was much more demanding of the tribes 
requiring a “much heavier burden of demonstrating their relationship” (Rosen 1980).  Rosen says 
that if the connection is ambiguous then the claim of the tribes is no stronger than the parties 
interested in keeping or studying the remains.  Alternatively, if remains are not necessarily connected 
with modern tribes, nor are they of sufficient scientific value, then the burden of proof shifts to rest 
on the scientific community to prove why they should be kept.  If a judge deems this to be 
insufficient reason, then the remains should be turned over to the tribe. 
 Much of this early plan is problematic, not the least of which that the shift in burden of 
proof would be legally untenable.  However, this initial plan can be seen as very similar to many of 
the final tenets of NAGPRA, as we shall see in the next chapter.  Both are concerned with tribal 
sovereignty and property law priority, strength of case in shared relationship between modern tribes 
and the remains, and empowering tribes to reattain culturally sensitive property.  The questions to 
consider for the purposes of this paper are: Was this directly influential in the creation of 
NAGPRA?  Or were the parallel considerations of both Rosen’s proposal and NAGPRA 
representing a shared repatriation ethic? 
 This concept of an emerging repatriation ethic was reaffirmed by academics over and over 
throughout the next decade.  Shortly after Rosen’s article was published, Larry Zimmerman, an 
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archaeologist in South Dakota, began publishing a series of scholarly pieces on repatriation issues.  
In 1983, Zimmerman and a colleague published an account of Lakota elders’ opinions on reburials 
(Zimmerman 1986a).  A few years later, Zimmerman published a review of recent scholarly work on 
repatriation, collating information on the topic that made it even more accessible (see Zimmerman 
1986a).  The same year, he published a pair of vignettes illustrating the epistemological differences 
between Natives and scientists in terms of Native burials (Zimmerman 1986b).  
 Zimmerman was not the only academic addressing this issue, nor were all academics in 
agreement (Zimmerman 1986a; Zimmerman 1989).  However, the repatriation issue was thrust into 
the anthropological discourse of the 1980’s.  Debates arose between those that were pro-repatriation 
and those that were anti-repatriation (Echo-Hawk and Trope 2000; Fine-Dare 2002b; McKeown 
2012).  The emergence of this sensitive issue onto the anthropology scene should be seen as 
indicative of a changing repatriation ethic within the field of anthropology.  Practitioners of 
anthropology just a quarter of a century prior would likely not have given a second thought to 
repatriation whereas the 1980’s saw enough of a change within the field that the case was brought to 
the (supposed) proprietors of federal Indian law and policy: the US Senate. 
 
Legislative History 
   In the same year that Zimmerman published his review of repatriation literature, a traditional 
religious leader of the Northern Cheyenne, William Tallbull, visited the Smithsonian Institution in 
Washington, D.C. by invitation (McKeown 1)2.  There, Tallbull found himself searching for the 
sacred pipe that was taken from his grandfather Chief Tall Bull’s body shortly after he was killed in 
1869.  Tallbull did find and was allowed to see and hold the sacred pipe, a moment that 
overwhelmed the religious leader (McKeown 4).  However, by chance Tallbull and other tribal 
                                                 
2
 In this section, unless otherwise noted, all references on the legislative history come from McKeown’s In the 
Smaller Scope of Conscience: The Struggle for National Repatriation Legislation, 1986-1990 
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representatives were exposed to the skeletal collections at the Smithsonian, which housed nearly 
18,500 Native individuals.  This discovery deeply disturbed Tallbull and his companions, enough for 
him to visit Senator John Melcher from Montana later that day to plead for the return of the pipe 
and human remains to their home (McKeown 4). 
 Melcher thus began in 1986 the first efforts at what would eventually become NAGPRA and 
the National Museum of the American Indian Act (McKeown 4-8).  The political atmosphere that 
lent itself to the creation of such laws was largely generated by the Red Power movement and two 
key federal rulings.  In 1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act which 
acknowledged that over 40 million acres of land were illegally taken from Native Alaskans and they 
would subsequently be compensated $1 billion for the land that would be managed by new Native 
Alaskan corporations created by the act (Hirschfield 1992; Walsh 1985).  Though in retrospect the 
new organization structure has proven to be problematic, at the time the settlement was viewed as a 
major victory for Natives in the United States.  Shortly thereafter, the Sioux Nation’s claim for the 
Black Hills was again brought to the courts.  In 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that the Black Hills 
were indeed taken improperly and that the nine tribes of the Sioux Nation should be awarded $106 
million for the land (Simmons-Ritchie 2013).  Clearly the precedent was established in the 70’s and 
80’s for the recognition of valid Native claims. 
 It was in this light that Senator Melcher first created the proposed Native American Cultural 
Preservation Act in 1986 and 1987 (McKeown 4-16).  This act would create a Native American 
Advisory Council that would adjudicate claims for Native remains from scientific institutions.  
Melcher was clear that the act meant to weigh the Native claims against the scientific value of the 
remains, either of which could be determined more valuable than the other (McKeown 6-7).  The 
act also provided for the return of “recent” remains and not “ancient” remains to claimant tribes 
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(McKeown 9-12).  It was clear that Melcher very much respected the potential scientific value of the 
remains and ultimately the scientific value could very well trump Native claims in many cases. 
 Melcher amended the bill in 1988, but when he lost his re-election bid that year he was 
unable to continue sponsoring the effort (McKeown 16-27).  Fortunately, the year prior Melcher’s 
efforts had inspired efforts in Congress to create a national museum for Native Americans on the 
National Mall.  This effort would combine the Native collections at the National Museum of 
Natural History and the Heye collection at the Museum of the American Indian in New York City 
(McKeown 28).  Amidst the ongoing discussions on repatriation, it was revealed that the 
Smithsonian Institution alone had 18,500 individuals.  Upon hearing this from Suzan Shown Harjo 
during a testimony requesting repatriation legislation, Representative Sidney Yates asked, “Did you 
know about [the human remains collection] before now?” and when Harjo answered that she did, 
Yates replied, “How come you didn’t tell us?” (McKeown 10). 
 The creation process for what would become the National Museum of the American Indian 
(NMAI) on the National Mall included several legislative incarnations that directly or indirectly 
addressed repatriation.  Likely due to the significance of a national museum, its location on the 
national mall, and the involvement of the Smithsonian Institution, this bill seemed to take priority 
over general repatriation legislation.  However, the original version of the bill had provisions that 
required the inventory and cultural identification of all Native American human remains in the 
collection (McKeown 31).  After identification, the Smithsonian was required to consult the related 
tribes in regard to every individual on the proper reburial processes.  For those individuals that could 
not be identified, they would be reinterred at a monument site on the National Mall (McKeown 31).  
This plan met resistance however, as reinterment of all human remains in the collection, including 
those unclaimed and unidentified, was contradictory to the mission of museums as scientific 
institutions (McKeown 31).  A second version of the bill was proposed by Representative Theodore 
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Weiss that did not include the repatriation provisions, though Senator John McCain pointed out that 
it had been formulated without consultation of Natives (McKeown 33).  It is clear that this version 
of the legislation did not gain any traction. 
 In large part due to resistance from the Smithsonian Institution, the second version of the 
bill proposed in April 1988 removed the inventory burden from the Smithsonian and placed it with 
a repatriation task force appointed by Congress and the president (McKeown 39).  The task force 
was required to complete the inventory and make recommendations for repatriations to Congress 
for the entirety of the NMAI collections within one year.  This version of the bill also removed the 
certainty from the reinterment monument for unidentifiable individuals on the National Mall but left 
it a possibility (McKeown 39). 
 As the resistance to the repatriation tenets of the proposed National Museum of the 
American Indian Act grew, Representative Byron Dorgan proposed the Indian Remains Reburial 
Act, which again placed responsibility for identification, inventories, and repatriations of human 
remains of the NMAI collection on the Smithsonian Institution for all remains from after 1600 AD 
(McKeown 40-41).  This version of the bill was unique for its proposed empowerment of 
terminated tribes and state-recognized tribes.  A revision of this bill proposed in February 1989 
pushed back the affiliation date to 1500 AD (McKeown 56).  However, Dorgan’s bill was not 
comprehensive enough to gain any traction in the face of the proposed NMAI bill and seemingly 
was only meant to impress the importance of repatriation in any plan for the NMAI. 
 On May 8, 1989, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the Smithsonian 
Institution and the Heye Foundation with the Smithsonian thus gaining the Heye collection 
(McKeown 57).  On May 11, Senator Daniel Inouye proposed a NMAI act based on the 
memorandum (McKeown 58).  This act again provided for the identification and affiliation of 
human remains within one year and recommendations to Congress for their repatriation within three 
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years.  A month later another bill was proposed in the House of Representatives that added 
associated funerary objects to the affiliation and inventory process.  It also was the first bill to 
propose appropriations to fund inventory and repatriation activities (McKeown 59). 
 An updated version of the House of Representatives bill in November of 1989 included 
more detailed directions for the Smithsonian as to how repatriation would be conducted.  The 
Smithsonian would be responsible for inventorying and affiliating the human remains.  They then 
would notify the respective tribes and repatriate the remains upon request to the related tribes 
(McKeown 73-74).  It also authorized the creation of a task force to oversee the inventory and 
repatriation process to ensure fairness. 
 When the Senate’s version of the NMAI act reached the House of Representatives, the 
House replaced much of the text with that of their own bill (McKeown 75-76).  It was then passed 
and sent back to the Senate where it was again passed.  On November 28, 1989 the National 
Museum of the American Indian Act became law (McKeown 77).  The final law included provisions 
for the inventorying of human remains and funerary objects associated with the remains with the 
intent of determining cultural affiliation (Association on American Indian Affairs n.d.; Repatriation 
Office 2013).  Those remains or funerary objects that could be culturally affiliated were identified 
and then the tribes with a shared culture were informed and allowed to make claims for repatriation.  
At the time of promulgation, the NMAIA did not require any repatriation efforts for sacred objects 
or cultural patrimony, both of which were the instigators of the legislation when William Tallbull 
requested the return of his tribe’s sacred pipe (Association on American Indian Affairs n.d.; 
Repatriation Office 2013). 
 The road was longer for nationwide repatriation legislation.  Melcher’s second repatriation 
bill effort culminated in a revised version of now called the Native American Museum Claims 
Commission Act (McKeown 16-17).  This new version reduced the size of the claims commission to 
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three members appointed by the president, one of which was required to be Native American.  This 
bill provided for the repatriation of human remains, funerary objects, and ceremonial artifacts.  In 
doing so, the bill explicitly was intended to protect what rights had intended to be protected by the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act (McKeown 16-18).  In this way, the bill framed the 
repatriation issue strictly within the confines of freedom of religion. 
 Melcher was not able push this bill for long as he was not re-elected in 1988.  However, 
Senator Wyche Fowler from Georgia and Representative Charles Bennett from Florida fronted 
efforts at integrating the repatriation tenets into existing historic preservation law (McKeown 43-47).  
These efforts turned into expansive and difficult amendments to the National Historic Preservation 
Act, Historic Sites Act, Archaeological Resources Protection Act, and Abandoned Shipwrecks Act.  
The difficulties in passing these wide-ranging changes in the Senate were damning for the bills, 
however it is important to note a few aspects of the acts.  Fowler’s bill provided for the prevention 
of non-necessary exhumation of remains, repatriation after non-invasive studies for exhumed 
remains, and for the ability of scientists to retain remains in cases of extreme scientific significance 
of the remains (McKeown 43-44).  This proviso is one of the most debated in every version of the 
law, and even in the modern application of NAGPRA today.  Bennett’s bill was in keeping with 
Melcher’s efforts in creating legislation that better protected religious rights seemingly afforded by 
the American Indian Religious Protection Act (McKeown 45-47). 
 Shortly following the introduction of Bennett’s act in the House, Representative Morris 
Udall from Arizona presented his version of a repatriation bill called the Native American Grave 
and Burial Protection Act (McKeown 47).  This bill, meant to inspire further dialogue on the issue, 
included expanded efforts to deter illegal trafficking of burial artifacts and sacred objects.  It also 
provided strict guidelines for determining the validity of a repatriation claim (McKeown 47-48).  
First priority went to tribes on whose reservation the objects were found.  Second priority went to 
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tribes who aboriginally occupied the land on which the object was found.  The third priority went to 
tribes that could demonstrate a cultural affiliation to the object (McKeown 48).  It also required 
inventories including all possibly relevant items to be finished within two years of the act’s 
promulgation and notification to the respective tribes within three years.  Tribes that had valid 
claims based on the identification made by the museum could then reacquire the items within two 
years of their request (McKeown 48). 
 In April of 1989, Senator John McCain created a largely parallel bill to Udall’s for the 
Senate’s consideration (McKeown 49).  This bill, also called the Native American Grave and Burial 
Protection Act, most significantly differed from Udall’s in that it introduced “grave goods” and 
sacred ceremonial objects as protected items under the law (McKeown 50).  It is important to note 
that to this point, versions of both what would become NAGPRA and NMAIA consistently in 
disagreement as to whether or not they would include ceremonial objects – as clearly demonstrated 
by the absence of ceremonial objects in Udall’s bill.  In fact, the NMAIA surprisingly did not include 
these objects in their federally mandated repatriation process.   
 Both Fowler and Bennett presented revised versions of their bills amending the historic 
preservation acts (McKeown 51-55).  Minor changes were made to both that brought them a great 
deal of consideration in Congress.  However, still neither dealt with ceremonial objects and their 
approach to amend several laws rather than create a new one was eventually surpassed by the efforts 
of McCain, Udall, and Senator Inouye. 
 In November of 1989, Inouye entered his own bill, utilizing many parts of Melcher’s original 
bill, including the claims commission concept of adjudicating claims on a case by case basis, as well 
as some parts from McCain’s and Udall’s bills(McKeown 79-82).  Inouye’s was more extreme in its 
protections of Native interests, allowing any interested tribe to request repatriation of excavated 
human remains, funerary objects, or sacred objects.  Inouye didn’t want the law to consider these 
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types of objects as archaeological resources under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act and 
wanted them to have their own unique status as religious tribal resources (McKeown 81-82).  In 
addition, Inouye sought to have the burden of proof on the museums to prove legal title or lack of 
validity to tribal claim for human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony 
(McKeown 80-81).  This was also the first time cultural patrimony was introduced separately of 
sacred objects, defined as inalienable communal property.  The extreme proposals of the bill met 
considerable resistance from the Society of American Archaeology (McKeown 82). 
 The revised version of Inouye’s bill took a new name, the Native American Grave 
Protection and Repatriation Act, and a new sponsor, Senator McCain (McKeown 94).  The tenets of 
this bill stayed the same, with updated definitions, directions, and penalties that helped clarify much 
of the original text.  One new aspect of the bill included provisions for a review committee to 
inventory culturally unidentifiable remains and advise on actions towards disposition of these 
individuals (McKeown 95).  Despite the momentum this version of the bill seemed to be gaining 
with the widespread support from the legislators pushing for a repatriation law, the bill faced just as 
ardent opposition in the Society for American Archaeology (SAA) and the American Association of 
Museums (AAM) as well as other, less powerful organizations and individuals (McKeown 98-112).  
The SAA in particular did not approve of much of the bill, especially the section including 
provisions for disposition of culturally unidentifiable individuals by saying, “We cannot live with this 
subsection.  By including implementation of the return of unaffiliated remains, this creates an 
enormous task that has not been adequately considered” (McKeown 97).  Representatives from the 
Society for American Archaeology pled that Congress reconsider the former repatriation bills in light 
of this new and extreme bill (McKeown 97-98). 
 In July of 1990, Representative Udall introduced a new version of the Native American 
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act that was meant to be a compromise between previous 
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repatriation bills, scientific concerns, and McCain’s bill that was under consideration (McKeown 
113-120).  Udall included the Smithsonian under the bill’s purview, something legislators had been 
considering in light of the NMAIA’s blatant deficiencies (McKeown 113).  Udall’s bill also placed 
priority of claim on cultural affiliation over aboriginal occupation, though finds on reservation lands 
still took highest priority.  Also of note was that Udall included no exceptions to repatriation claims 
or archaeological excavations in terms of scientific significance.  It was clear that Udall felt that there 
was no excuse for remains to not be returned or exhumations to occur without approval.  Much to 
the chagrin of many lobbyists fighting aspects of the repatriation legislation, Udall again included 
provisions for the disposition of culturally unidentifiable human remains (McKeown 116). 
 By August of 1990, a general repatriation bill was seemingly imminent.  As Timothy 
McKeown put it,  
“the number of repatriation bills ostensibly under consideration…had grown from the single 
ill-fated effort introduced without a cosponsor by Montana Senator John Melcher…to seven 
different measures sponsored by five different senators and representatives and cosponsored 
by fifty-eight of their colleagues” (McKeown 139). 
 
The field quickly narrowed to Inouye’s bill in the Senate and Udall’s bill in the House (McKeown 
140).  Negotiations on Udall’s Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act between 
lobbyists from both sides of the issue rendered new definitions for cultural affiliation, funerary 
objects, and sacred objects as well as outlined a new process for the burden of proof (McKeown 
140-153). In the days prior to the passage of the act, the Smithsonian was excluded from the 
repatriation legislation, despite what had clearly been an attempt to subject the Smithsonian 
Institution to a higher repatriation standard (McKeown 163-164).   
 Finally, on November 16th 1990, President George H. W. Bush signed the Native American 
Graves Protection Act into law (McKeown 166).  The act provided for the repatriation of human 
remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony to federally-recognized tribes on 
the basis of cultural affiliation, jurisdiction via reservation lands, jurisdiction via aboriginal lands, or a 
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vested interest.  In order to accomplish this goal, museums – which are defined as any institution 
receiving federal funds – must make publically available inventories and summaries of NAGPRA 
related material.  Subsequently, determinations of cultural affiliation are to be made by the museums 
in consultation with the relevant tribes (Department of the Interior 1990).  
The law also includes prohibitions on the sale or illegal excavation of NAGPRA related 
material, however the repatriation tenet will be the focus of this paper to deduce what might be 
considered the American repatriation ethic.  By understanding the current repatriation ethic in the 
United States we can reflect on the priorities in archaeology, anthropology, museums, science, and 
Indian Policy.  We can also situate the American repatriation ethic alongside the repatriation ethics 
of other countries, in international organizations.  At a global scale, new considerations also emerge 
when reconciling what is generally considered human rights protection that has broad and lasting 
implications for the present and these repatriation ethics. 
 
Deciphering the Intent 
To comprehend the moving target that is an ethic at the center of the repatriation efforts in 
Congress, we must ask ourselves why Congress addressed this issue and then how Congress 
addressed this issue.  As a social body, Congress represents an elite sub-culture that has the majority 
of political power over US and Native American – though that has been subject to controversy in 
recent years – affairs.  In our democratic-republic, the members of Congress represent the people 
within certain geographic boundaries.  The incentive for these political figures is to not alienate their 
constituency, both in votes and funding, that has the power to re-elect them.  There is little systemic 
incentive for going beyond this bare-minimum, and in fact controversial positions on legislation are 
discouraged regardless of the broader cost-benefit of the potential law.  In this way, politician’s 
loyalty exclusively lies with his or her constituency in operating within the political system.  This is 
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not to say that politicians have not and will not act contrary to the wishes of those that have the 
power to re-elect them, however they are not systemically incentivized to do so. 
Because of the direct influence of a constituency with the power to re-elect, Native 
American affairs have suffered in Congress.  Native Americans only represent about 1% of the 
population of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau 2013) and only in states with very high 
percentages of Native Americans such as Alaska, Hawai’i, and South Dakota are there some degrees 
of political influence for Native peoples.  Unable to have their concerns addressed by Congress, 
Native agendas have increasingly been settled by the US Supreme Court (Echo-Hawk 2013).  
However, when Native affairs are addressed in modern Congress, it has often been the case that it 
was in regard to what many considered human rights issues (Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act, American Indian Religious Protection Act, Native American Languages 
Act, Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act, Tribal Law and Order Act, 
and controversially the Indian Child Welfare Act). 
When Senator Melcher brought forth the “Bones Bill” as the first repatriation legislation to 
the Senate floor, shortly after William Tallbull decried the fact that human remains and sacred 
objects were held at the Smithsonian, it was clear that this proposal was protecting what Melcher 
considered a “human right” of return of those objects.  In fact, Melcher specifically called Congress 
to “protect Native American rights to the remains of their dead and to sacred objects” (McKeown 
5).  In his bill, Melcher seemed to indicate that Native rights over their dead were not necessarily 
higher priority than the institutional and professional rights of museums and archaeologists that kept 
and studied them (McKeown 12).  In cases in which the remains were deemed sufficiently valuable 
to non-Native institutions the claims commission were meant to prioritize the non-Native claim.  
This aspect of the repatriation ethic was confirmed by Fowler’s historic preservation 
amendments (McKeown 43-44), Bennett’s repatriation provisions in the historic preservation 
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amendments proposed in the House (McKeown 45-47, and Udall and McCain’s respective general 
repatriation bills (McKeown 47-51).  It wasn’t until Inouye proposed his radical changes in his 
Native American Repatriation and Cultural Patrimony Act in November of 1989 that this trend 
switched (McKeown 80-81).  In his bill, Inouye based repatriation of human remains, funerary 
objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony on the concept of valid title, which required museums 
to demonstrate they had proper and legal title to the objects (McKeown 81).  If this could not be 
demonstrated, then the objects would be repatriated to the tribes for whom title could be assumed 
based on the preponderance of evidence.  NAGPRA eventually followed this later ethic, though it is 
clear that even advocates of repatriation, who also are generally members of the Western, secular 
ideologies, gave ultimate priority to science in the event that the remains or objects were of extreme 
scientific significance. 
Although it seems as though the original and general intent did favor this scientific priority, a 
precedent was set by Senator Inouye that was not retracted in the year leading up to NAGPRA’s 
promulgation.  In this way, we can consider this precedent as an unmet ethic with precedence, 
indicating that because it was not retracted, Congress – despite the fact that the advocates of this 
legislation clearly did not wholeheartedly agree with this tenet – confirmed this tenet as an ethic that 
would be realized by the American people at some point in the future.  This concept we will call the 
ethic realization trajectory.  When a precedent is set for an ethic that may not be normalized at the 
time, tacit complicity with the ethical precedent as well as advocation for the ethic – especially by 
those that benefit from it – will eventually see the normalization of the ethic sometime in the future.   
There are many good examples of this ethic realization trajectory, especially in law.  Laws 
providing for women’s suffrage, African-American civil rights, Native American self-determination 
all were not normalized ethics of the time.  They were ethical precedents set by the establishments of 
bills that were voted into law by people that often were not in agreement with their tenets.  
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However, if we again consider the primary objective of politicians in the political system of the 
United States, it is to get re-elected.  Politicians must consider these forthcoming ethics regardless of 
their own interests in order to remain popular throughout social movements.  They may also have 
some incentive to be on the “cutting edge” of these movements in the event that they will be 
normalized.  Many political careers, regardless of the politician’s actual position, have been gambled 
on action or inaction in respect to these movements and emerging ethics. 
The scope of the proposed repatriation bills also differed significantly.  The very first bills, 
proposed by Melcher included human remains, funerary objects, and sacred objects (McKeown 6).  
The National Museum of the American Indian Act, as we noted above, only included human 
remains and funerary objects (McKeown 77).  Fowler and Bennett’s bills followed suit and originally 
only addressed human remains and funerary objects (McKeown 43; 46).  However, Udall and 
McCain’s bills included “sacred ceremonial objects” (McKeown 48; 500 and Inouye’s November of 
1989 bill introduced “cultural patrimony,” which he defined as an item of such significance to a tribe 
that it could not be owned by any one individual and belonged collectively to the tribe (McKeown 
80).  Again, the precedent set by Inouye in introducing this new concept stuck in subsequent bills 
and can be found in the legislation today.  However, it is also clear that there was a line between 
those that felt this bill should only deal with burials and those that felt all material aspects of 
religious expression should be protected. 
On the issue of cultural affiliation and culturally unidentifiable remains there was also a 
diversity of opinion.  Not all bills addressed what NAGPRA would later consider “culturally 
unidentifiable” individuals (Fowler’s, Bennett’s, Dorgan’s, the latter NMAI bills), however those that 
did differed significantly in their approach.  The early bills proposing the National Museum of the 
American Indian included a burial and monument for all unidentifiable individuals in the 
Smithsonian collection on the National Mall.  This was a disturbing prospect to many politicians 
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however, and was the plan was scrapped (McKeown 31).  In the end, no provisions were made in 
the NMAI Act and the Smithsonian’s policy is to retain culturally unidentifiable individuals until 
scientific techniques are developed that could be used to reevaluate their cultural connections, a 
policy that has caused some controversy (Government Accountability Office 2011).  Neither 
Fowler’s nor Bennett’s repatriation amendments included provisions for culturally unidentifiable 
individuals.  Repatriation in both Udall and McCain’s bills was contingent upon determining cultural 
affiliation and did not address what should happen to those remains that cannot be identified.  
Inouye’s bill was again revolutionary in its requiring of the claims commission to make 
recommendations to Congress regarding culturally unidentifiable individuals.  Here again a 
precedent was set, however this provision was dropped from the bill at the last minute in order to 
gain approval from the SAA and the AAM.  In this way, the ethic certainly confirmed ambivalence 
toward culturally unidentifiable remains though a precedent was set for dealing with culturally 
unidentifiable remains. 
In the end, the legislation largely reflected the repatriation ethic of the time in the United 
States.  Repatriation of human remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and cultural patrimony was 
required of museums that could determine cultural affiliation for these kinds of items.  For these 
kinds of items that cultural affiliation could not be determined, the law was resoundingly silent.  The 
only aspects of the law that were not normalized into the professional and public ethics at the time 
was the inclusion of non-burial objects (many of which possessors claimed were “legally” bought 
from tribe members around the turn of the 20th century) and the priority of Native interests over 
scientific interests.  The latter materialized in a controversial ruling against the letter and spirit of the 
law in court years later. 
So what was this repatriation ethic and its legal manifestation in NAGPRA meant to do?  It 
is clear that the entire point of creating this legislation was to empower tribes to reattain their 
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ancestors, necessary ceremonial objects, and objects required for the well-being of their tribe and 
their culture.  The efficiency of this empowerment is suspect.  Congress had, and still has, no 
incentive to do more than realize basic human rights for Indian Country.  Action on Congress’ part 
can be seen as empowerment of Indian Country, but only to the extent that seemed necessary based 
on the repatriation ethic and human rights.  Examples of this can be seen throughout the history of 
federal Indian law and policy.  Laws like the American Indian Religious Protection Act defended 
Native Americans’ rights to religious freedom, however it neglected the issues that NAGPRA went 
on to address.  The Indian Land Claims Commission was formed to hear Native property claims but 
really wasn’t empowered to make much change to benefit Natives.  By rule, especially since the 
official position of tribal sovereignty was adopted by the US government in the 1970s, federal Indian 
policy has meant to minimally empower Native communities in order for their basic rights to be 
realized. 
Ultimately, NAGPRA was addressing a demand of Native peoples for over a century; if their 
culture and sovereignty are to survive in the United States they must have more power and control 
over their own interests.  This power is recognized by Congress and Natives alike as having been 
systematically wrested from them for over 500 years.  In this case, Natives did not have the power to 
have family members, including those remains for whom names were known, returned and reburied.  
Nor did they have the power, as William Tallbull was pointing out, to have familial heritage and 
sacred objects necessary for the practice of their religion returned, despite being taken illegally.  This 
legislation was meant to give a modicum of power over Natives’ own interests and rights. 
38 
 




This “history” of the emergence of NAGPRA is obviously a construct of both my own and 
the Western epistemology in general.  The micro-interactions, the philosophical walls, and many 
other aspects of a well-rounded “history” are not included in the account above, but are included to 
orient this paper toward an evaluation of the law and its efficiency.  To be clear, this evaluation and 
its considerations are not comprehensive, nor are they definitively correct.  However, the purpose of 
this paper is to use my own experience and tools to deconstruct a process that could better serve the 
population it intended to help.  In fact this chapter begins with a look at some compensation the 
government had to make in order to better direct the newly promulgated NAGPRA law.  Then the 
whole of NAGPRA and its regulations can be evaluated against what can be discerned as intent of 
the law.  This will set us up in the next chapter to measure the repatriation process of the United 
States against the repatriation ethics and processes internationally. 
When NAGPRA was promulgated in the last week of the 101st Congress, those that fought 
for its passage knew it was a flawed law.  Jack Trope, whose organization the Association on 
American Indian Affairs figured prominently in the negotiations for NAGPRA, said “it is axiomatic 
that it is far easier to block a bill than to pass one” so advocates of a repatriation bill had in 1990 “a 
narrow window of opportunity to negotiate modest changes to build consensus behind the bill and 
maximize its chances of passage” (Trope, 2013).  According to Walter Echo Hawk, Jr., another 
prominent figure in the negotiations, “People don’t realize that if we hadn’t gotten the bill through 
that year, the SAA and AAM lobbyists, and probably other organizations, would have been able to 
curb all of the advances we had been able to fight for to that point” (Echo-Hawk, 2013).  Despite 
these problems, NAGPRA and its subsequent regulations have dictated the kinds and processes of 
repatriation in the United States.  Several issues have been addressed by the regulatory bodies of 
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NAGPRA, however many more have been left unaddressed and are regularly encountered by those 
working with the law. 
Knowing full well that NAGPRA was not perfect, the bill was pushed through Congress and 
signed into law by President Bush on November 16, 1990.  In the months and years after it was 
passed, there were significant issues in determining who had oversight of the law and how the law 
would be administered (McKeown 2013).  However, even during this time issues, especially around 
interpretation, arose with the institutions that were trying to implement it.  First of all, for large 
museums like the Peabody Museum at Harvard and the Hearst Museum at University of California, 
Berkeley, the inventory deadlines were far too short.  The amount of institutional investment, both 
in time and money, to complete summaries and inventories as well as to consult with tribes and 
make cultural affiliation determinations were vastly underestimated.  Many of these large institutions 
applied for, and received, extensions on their inventory requirements and many of those institutions 
are still working today to finish those summaries and inventories that were due in 1993 and 1995 
respectively (McKeown 2013).  In addition, many museums trying to gain compliance with the law, 
as well as archaeologists trying to retain the material they had excavated, criticized for its vague 
definition of cultural affiliation, the rising disputes over “culturally unidentifiable” individuals, and 
the gray area as to whether or not “scientific studies” could be conducted on remains before they are 
repatriated (Giesen 1996.; Kintigh 1999).  
 
The Regulations 
The regulations themselves are publications by the Secretary of the Interior made to detail 
how the law will be administered (USA.gov 2014).  Oftentimes, federal regulations are used to clarify 
aspects of the law that were seemingly ambiguous in the text or to ensure what the Secretary 
considers the correct interpretation of the law.   
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The first set of regulations for NAGPRA was published in December 1995 Department of 
the Interior 2014).  Obviously, this was problematic because the first regulations meant to 
administer the law were published after the due date established by the law for both summaries (by 
November 1993) and inventories (by November 1995).  In addition to extending the deadlines for 
these submissions, the new regulations  included all current regulations except for 10.7 on unclaimed 
remains, 10.11 on culturally unidentifiable individuals (CUIs), 10.12 on civil penalties, and 10.13 on 
future applicability (Department of the Interior 2014).  These 1995 regulations outlines how 
summaries and inventories were supposed to be completed, how consultation should be conducted, 
how repatriation is to be conducted, as well as how the review committee and dispute resolution will 
be conducted.  These were sorely needed by institutions and tribes fumbling in their utilization of 
the law. 
 Since 1995, three regulations have been published as of April 2014: 10.12 in 2003 detailing 
the penalization process for non-compliance with the law, 10.13 in 2007 creating future applicability 
of the law beyond the typical statutory limitations, and most controversially 10.11 in 2010 detailing 
the process of disposition for culturally unidentifiable individuals (Department of the Interior 
2014.). 
 43 CFR 10.11 addresses the glaring hole in NAGPRA’s original text, that of human remains 
– and by extension funerary objects associated with the remains – that could not be culturally 
affiliated.  The regulation had been in the works for over 10 years, with the review committees 
submitting comments on the proposed regulation in 2000, 2003, and 2008.  In October 2007 the 
proposed regulation was published in the Federal Register to garner comments from the general 
public for a 90 day period.  The Department of the Interior received 138 comments in that period 
and they were overwhelmingly against the regulation (Department of the Interior 2010).   
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 The regulation outlined the process for repatriating, or in NAGPRA’s terms 
“dispositioning,” culturally unidentifiable individuals back to tribes.  Obviously this caused 
considerable controversy due to the fact that the original legislation was notoriously silent on this 
topic.  10.11 required institutions to disposition unidentifiable remains to tribes on whose 
reservations the remains were found first, on whose aboriginal lands the remains were found second, 
and lastly if no geographic provenience was known then to any Native American tribe or Native 
Hawaiian Organization (Department of the Interior 2010). 
 Many museums and archaeologists agreed this new requirement was clearly outside the 
scope and intent of NAGPRA (American Association of Physical Anthropologists 2007; Society for 
American Archaeology 2007).  They argued that a balance between scientific and Native interests in 
human remains was at the center of the legislation.  This regulation, they argued, went beyond the 
intent of the legislation by clearly favoring Native interests in the human remains.  While NAGPRA, 
they argued, was a dagger in the side of American physical anthropology, the 2010 regulation was 
essentially the death knell. 
 The legislative history of NAGPRA describes a split Congress on the issue of culturally 
unidentifiable remains.  Over and over the issue was deliberately left out of proposed bills, and only 
a few attempts, most notably Senator Inouye’s November 1989 bill, included directions for 
addressing culturally unidentifiable remains.  However, it is just as significant that legislators left out 
provisions for the retention of culturally unidentifiable individuals by possessing, non-Native 
institutions as it is that they did not create provisions requiring the repatriation of them.  And in fact, 
provisions requiring disposition of unidentifiable remains were included in the bill up until the 11th 
hour, suggesting a consensus on CUIs had been reached, though it was blocked in the end by 
lobbyists of the SAA and AAM (McKeown 152-153).   
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 The Department of the Interior justified their authority by citing their authority within 
NAGPRA’s text, the inherent jurisdiction over all Native remains via the text of the original law, and 
ultimately the federal policy to construe all federal Indian law and policy in favor of the tribes.  
Ambiguous texts of laws are intended to be interpreted through regulations by the administrative 
body of the law.  In this case, the Department of the Interior was imbued with that power, its 
authority over the scope of the issue, and was obligated to construe the law in favor of the tribes.  It 
is also important to consider what was seemingly the basic intent of the law: to empower tribes to 
reattain remains and sacred objects.  This regulation again further empowered tribes to reattain 
remains that are important to many Native people.  To generalize the Native position, just because 
scientists are unable determine to whom they belong does not mean their spirits are contented to 
still be disturbed by remaining in museum collections (Watkins 2004).  Despite the controversial 
nature of such a ruling, it seems as though the Department of the Interior was fully justified and in 
fact obligated to create this regulation.   
 
Kennewick Man 
 The immediacy of the creation of this policy came after the appeals to the case Bonnichsen v. 
the United States, a case also known as the Kennewick Man case.  This case ultimately challenged the 
boundaries of cultural affiliation under NAGPRA’s original text.  The case involved an individual 
found by a couple of fans at a hydroplane race along the Columbia River near Kennewick, 
Washington in 1996.  The individual, excavated by the Army Corp of Engineers, is considered the 
oldest, most complete skeleton found in North America, estimated to be approximately 10,000 years 
old (Hurst Thomas 2000d; Fine-Dare 2002b; Nilsson Stutz 2012).  As if this were not significant 
enough for scientists, initial studies indicated the Kennewick Man had what scientists described as 
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“Caucasoid” features, meaning his facial structure seemed more similar to modern Euro-Americans 
than Native Americans (Burke et al. 2007). 
 Found near the Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation, the Army Corps of 
Engineers originally determined Kennewick Man to be culturally affiliated to the Umatilla and 
decided to halt scientific studies and repatriate the individual (Burke et al. 2007).  The scientists 
interested in what was considered a remarkable find decided to sue the decision of the Army Corp 
of Engineers based on their tenuous claim of cultural affiliation.  The scientists, including Robson 
Bonnichsen, C. Loring Brace, George W. Gill, C. Vance Haynes, Jr., Richard L. Jantz, Douglas W. 
Owsley, Dennis J. Stanford, and D. Gentry Steele, argued that because of the age of the remains and 
the scientifically understood times of tribal migrations that the preponderance of the evidence 
indicated that these modern tribes were not related to the Kennewick Man, which ultimately means 
that the Kennewick Man cannot be considered “Native American” within the definitions of 
NAGPRA.  The Native claims were based on their oral traditions indicating that they had always 
lived in that region and they claimed Kennewick Man to be a direct ancestor to their tribes, and in 
fact had to be Native American based on the individual being older than 500 years old and found in 
the United States.  According to the shared aspects of the beliefs of the claimant tribes, the 
Kennewick Man must be reburied in order for his spirit, as well as those of his descendants, to be at 
peace (Burke and Smith 2007). 
 On August 30th, 2002, Magistrate John Jelderks ruled in favor of the scientists, claiming that 
the definition of Native American under NAGPRA did not cover the Kennewick Man’s case and 
that he should be considered an archaeological resource under the Archaeological Resource 
Protection Act (Burke et al. 2007).  The claimant tribes appealed the decision but on February 4th, 
2004 the 9th Circuit Court upheld Judge Jelderks’ decision that the remains did not qualify under the 
terms of NAGPRA as Native American and thus shouldn’t be subject to the repatriation law.  The 
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claimant tribes tried to get the case reheard, but when they could not, they dropped the case instead 
of bringing it to the Supreme Court.  Not only were they short the resources to do so, but the tribes 
also feared that if they were to lose the case at the federal level the case may become law, which the 
tribes did not want to risk (Burke et al. 2007). 
 Despite the claimant tribes’ reticence to set a negative precedent, Bonnichsen v. the United States 
already set a precedent seemingly against the text of NAGPRA.  In the end, the case was determined 
in favor of the scientists based on the premise that the remains were not Native American (Bruning 
2006; Burke and Smith 2007).  To come to this finding, the court was specifically relying on 
scientific evidence that suggested a legally ambiguous identity for the individual.  At no time were 
the plaintiffs suggesting that the remains were anything other than Native American, and in fact 
studies completed by the Department of the Interior in January of 2000 determined that the remains 
were certainly Native American (Burke et al. 2007), however they were arguing they were not 
considered “Native American” as defined by NAGPRA.  Additionally the tribes’ evidence, including 
traditional knowledge, is required to be weighed evenly with scientific evidence in determining 
cultural affiliation under NAGPRA (Department of the Interior 1990).  If the oral traditions of the 
tribes determined that the individual was an ancestor and that their tribes had been in the area at the 
time the Kennewick Man was alive then this evidence alone would have qualified the Kennewick 
Man as Native American under NAGPRA.  However, the court sided with the scientific evidence, 
despite its ambiguity, setting a precedent for prioritizing scientific evidence over traditional tribal 
evidence. 
 This precedent was a significant motivating factor for the publication of 43 CFR 10.11 as 
well as for an amendment to NAGPRA created by original NAGPRA creators Senator John McCain 
and Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell expanding the definition of “Native American” (Burke et al. 
2007).  It was clear that the Kennewick Man decision contradicted the intent of NAGPRA both by 
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the people that created it (McCain and Nighthorse Campbell) and the people that administer it 
(Department of the Interior).  In fact the Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, had ruled prior to 
Judge Jelderks’ decision that the remains should be considered Native American and repatriated 
accordingly (Burke et al. 2007). 
 The result of 43 CFR 10.11 and the amendment to the definition of “Native American” have 
assured that a case similar to the Kennewick Man’s cannot occur again.  This further supports the 
assumption that NAGPRA was meant to be an instrument of empowerment for Native 
communities.  Now Natives are able to reattain all human remains that can be considered Native 
American (and not in the strict Kennewick Man definition).  Here at CSU, remains without any 
provenience or notes indicating anything about them are to be repatriated to the Ute Mountain Ute 
based on our assumption that they are Native.  This assumption is based on the idea that the 
Department of Anthropology never collected human remains that were not Native American and 
that the remains are in weathered and fragmentary condition.  To scientists, repatriating remains 
based on this evidence may seem to be unnecessary and disappointing, however to the Native 
communities that are working to rebury them it is a significant victory for them and their ancestors. 
 
Is NAGPRA Empowering? 
 So how effective is NAGPRA as a tool of empowerment? Power in this sense should not be 
understood in the Marxist sense as an instrument of oppression.  Here, it should be understood as 
both a result and instrument of sovereignty and human rights.  The power in question over human 
remains and sacred objects certainly can be –and has been – used as a tool of oppression.  However, 
the oppressive power – distinct from the sovereignty power – is created from inequitable 
sovereignty and rights.  The void of control in tribal sovereignty and human rights of Natives over 
their human remains and sacred objects represented an instrument of oppression.   The realization 
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and normalization of sovereignty and rights by the enactment of NAGPRA represents power to 
self-realize human rights.  In this way, NAGPRA should empower Native peoples to self-realize 
their own right to reattain human remains and sacred objects. 
The Department of the Interior presents an image of effectiveness for the law.  According to 
National NAGPRA’s 2013 fiscal year report, as of September 30th, 2013, there were 121,623 
culturally unidentifiable remains represented in 753 inventories as well as 57,903 culturally affiliated 
remains in 566 inventories (National NAGPRA 2013).  In total, this represents 179,526 individuals 
that have been inventoried in the United States to this point.  This is close to many of the estimates 
made prior to the establishment of NAGPRA, though some estimates were significantly higher and 
there are an unknown amount of remains that have not been inventoried in the United States.  It is 
also unknown exactly how many of those remains have been repatriated to date, though the last 
number provided by National NAGPRA in September 2009 was 38,671 (National NAGPRA n.d.).  
This was prior to the 2010 CUI regulation and numbers should have significantly increased in the 
last 5 years. 
 No doubt that remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony 
have been and will continue to be repatriated as a result of NAGPRA and its administrative body, 
however if we dissect the process by which it operates some significant issues arise.  Not only is 
NAGPRA inefficient in its approach to guiding repatriation, but it clearly suffers from the same 
colonial restrictions that have refused to adequately empower Native communities, even when a law 
was supposedly created specifically to empower them.  The limits on this empowerment can be 
debilitating to the process.  Here I outline eight problems of empowerment that NAGPRA should 





1. Consultation Power 
 As I explained at the beginning of the paper, this power of invitation is what spurred me to 
consider the ethical implications of the NAGPRA process.  The law specifically provides me, and 
other NAGPRA Coordinators throughout the country, the power of invitation to consultations.  If a 
person can justify within reason why you would or would not include certain tribes – or certain 
personalities within the tribes – then there are no repercussions.   
At CSU, in determining the tribes that would be invited to the consultation, I had to first 
evaluate the proveniences, burial methods, and associated artifacts for indications of who might 
potentially be related to the remains.  Using this method to determine who should be invited 
grounds cultural affiliation in NAGPRA in scientific knowledge.  Tribes with contradicting 
traditional knowledge to scientific knowledge are at an inherent disadvantage despite the directive in 
NAGPRA to weigh scientific and traditional knowledge evenly. 
In order to prevent inequity in the consultation process, tribes must be diligent about watching 
Notices of Inventory Completion on the Federal Register and/or stay in close communication with 
other tribal representatives.  Then after finding an instance in which a tribal representative believes 
he/she should have been consulted, they must create a counter-claim, or perhaps even sue, in order 
to gain recognition in the process.  This requires precious resources of time and money that 
shouldn’t be required of the people meant to have been empowered in the process. 
 
2. Power of Affiliation Determination 
 This is perhaps the most damning part of NAGPRA.  It is a law meant to balance Native 
knowledge and interests with Western, secular-scientific knowledge and interests in Native cultural 
heritage.  As I noted in discussing the Kennewick Man, these are supposed to be weighed evenly in 
cultural affiliation claim.  This is seemingly contradicted by the fact that the museums possessing the 
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NAGPRA-related items generally have Western, secular-scientific ideologies and are imbued with 
the power to determine cultural affiliation.   
At CSU, we hosted tribal representatives for consultations on two separate occasions.  My role 
in the consultation was to facilitate conversation and listen to all forms of evidence the tribal 
representatives could provide.  These experienced representatives discussed traditions, tribal 
histories, and traditional burial practices.  After the consultation, it was my prerogative to take that 
information into consideration in determining whether or not any of our remains could be culturally 
affiliated.  The process does not happen in the consultations or with the direct help of the tribes.  It 
takes place behind closed doors after the tribal representatives have left based on whatever evidence 
the scientific institution holding the remains finds compelling.  This is obviously problematic in 
considering the differing epistemologies of the stakeholders in the process. 
Even for those who feel NAGPRA was meant to strike a balance between tribal and scientific 
interests, this aspect should seem wholly unbalanced.  If real empowerment and balance was 
achieved by the law, tribes would have more direct influence on cultural affiliation decisions.  The 
law clearly puts the burden of the proof on scientific institutions to prove that Native evidence is 
not compelling, however, they are inexplicably given the choice to disregard Native input if 
scientifically justifiable.  Ultimately, tribes can sue this decision in order to have it overturned, but 
again Natives shouldn’t have to resort to this if they were genuinely empowered by the law.   
 
3. Tribal Priority 
Each tribe has very different circumstances.  Some are well set financially, especially those that 
have been able to significantly profit from the casino industry.  Others are suffering from some of 
the most significant poverty found in the United States.  Obviously, this means that different tribes 
are able to direct differing amounts of resources toward NAGPRA efforts, if any resources at all.   
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In CSU’s experience, previous efforts were made to consult with tribes even prior to my arrival 
at the university.  Despite several attempts, consultations did not occur do to the busyness of these 
tribal offices.  I was certainly stuck, and very disappointed, about the small showing in our 
consultation of December 2012, however the message was clear: this may be a high priority for you, 
but sometimes we have bigger fish to fry.  Over and over my conversations with tribal 
representatives have addressed their overwhelming workload.  Tribal Historic Preservation Officers, 
such as Terry Knight of the Ute Mountain Ute, deal with nearly every aspect State Historic 
Preservation Officer would, only with fewer resources.  This strain does not mean tribal 
representatives are invested in the best interests of the human remains, however they are often 
stretched too thin to take several days out of their schedule to travel and consult. 
This priority problem has two implications.  First, many of the tribes that are meant to be 
empowered by this law are not able to utilize it due to lack of resources.  National NAGPRA offers 
no grants to tribes trying to fund repatriation positions3.  Second, tribes that do not have resources 
during this repatriation era will be left without the ability to repatriate remains they might have an 
interest in after all or most of the remains are repatriated and reburied.  Currently, if cultural 
affiliation can be made and the potentially affiliated tribe does not claim the individuals the museum 
can then repatriate the individuals to any other affiliated or interested tribe(s) (43 CFR 10.15). 
 
4. Power of the Courts (and Language) 
 It seems silly to note, but it is important, that this is a law made by Euro-Americans using 
the Euro-American legal system in the Euro-American legal English language.  When we consider 
how the different constructed realities of those that live within this Euro-American system and 
those on a Native American reservation where the traditions and language are trying to be preserved, 
                                                 
3
 National NAGPRA’s “project” grants can fund positions for specific projects – but unless a tribal representative is 
able to secure a position that can enter into a “project” with a museum is a matter of tribal resources 
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problems in their reconciliation emerge.  Though Native organizations, most notably the Native 
American Rights Fund and the Association of American Indian Affairs, were involved in the 
development of this law, the law was made to reflect and adhere to the Euro-American ideology.  
When consulting with a tribe from whom we received a request for repatriation, I asked whether 
or not the tribal representative considered the individual to be “culturally affiliated” to them or 
“culturally unidentifiable” for the purposes of NAGPRA.  The representative said he appreciated 
the question, but did not really know how to answer the question, “From my understanding, I would 
say you would call this person ‘culturally unidentifiable,’ but obviously we [the tribe] don’t look at it 
that way.” 
The language and definitions within the law are created (with some Native input) by Euro-
American legislators.  The structure of the law, what it addresses and does not address, are subject to 
the Euro-American legal process.  The most obvious examples of this problem are all the points that 
are addressed in this section of the paper.  If more effort were put into making this a truly Native 
law, there would not be so many power disparities within it. 
 
5. The Dead without Power 
 Too often forgotten in this process are the dead themselves.  So much of burial common 
law in the United States functions on the basis of the wishes of the deceased (West's Encyclopedia 
of American Law 2008).  NAGPRA is a law that was made to empower modern Native Americans 
on the basis of their interests and religious beliefs.  However, very little can be found in the 
proposed bills, the hearings, or other dialogues addressing the interests of the deceased themselves.  
This has become especially problematic with the new CUI regulation requiring the disposition of all 
culturally unaffiliated individuals.  In some cases, individuals may be dispositioned to a tribe that 
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were enemies or potentially could have even killed them.  Burial common law makes the wishes of 
dead in terms of their burial the priority right to be recognized post-mortem.   
Many tribal NAGPRA leaders, like those that consulted with Colorado State University, have 
chosen to keep individuals listed as culturally unidentifiable in order to expedite the process and 
keep the remains together.  In those cases, individuals that likely could be affiliated may not be 
represented in their own best interest.  It may be that they are – if the deceased’s priority would be 
to get reburied as quickly as possibly – but in other cases the deceased may much prefer being 
reburied with their own people or much nearer to where they were found.  Unfortunately, many of 
the issues already addressed, such as resource issues and the power of language, also negatively affect 
this process and often adequate consideration. 
 
6. Power “Balance” Between Stakeholders 
In the SAA’s memorandum detailing why they opposed 43 CFR 10.11, the first point was that 
NAGPRA intended to balance the interests of Natives and scientists (Society for American 
Archaeology 2007).  It is debatable whether or not NAGPRA was created with the intent to balance 
interests.  I would argue it was strictly intended to be an empowerment legislation that had 
limitations built in based on Western, secular scientific interests that are prioritized by the ideology 
of the people that created the legislation.  It also seems short-sighted to call NAGPRA “human 
rights” legislation, as will be addressed in further detail in the next chapter, and then say that it 
should balance Native human rights with scientific interests.   
However, if you figure that NAGPRA was meant to balance these interests, the CUI ruling is 
genuinely problematic.  Institutions now have no power to retain human remains unless control is 
given to them by the tribes.  As we shall see in the next chapter, this CUI ruling is not in keeping 
with the repatriation ethics throughout the world.  It is again problematic considering problems 
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number 3 and 5.  If scientific techniques are able to advance to a point that could affiliate currently 
unidentifiable individuals, would it be in the deceased best interest to wait until that technique is 
developed?  And if it could be affiliated to a tribe that currently does not have the resources to 
participate in the repatriation era to the degree they might like, would it behoove those potential 
stakeholders to wait?  In both cases, I am not suggesting that the answers should contradict modern 
praxis, however it seems as though this praxis was developed without much consideration of these 
questions. 
 
7. Lack of International Power 
 It became painfully obvious in 2013 how little influence NAGPRA has outside our borders.  
Sacred objects of the Hopi and Apache appeared twice at a French auction house.  In both cases, a 
French lawyer, Pierre Servan-Schreiber, represented the tribes pro-bono but could not convince the 
French judge to delay the auction in order to prepare a case against the sales (Mashberg 2013; Oakes 
2013).  Servan-Schreiber’s cases were based on using NAGPRA to demonstrate there was no legal 
title to the sacred objects, as well as the UNESCO 1970 Convention on cultural property.  As sacred 
objects and cultural patrimony, it would be illegal to have bought these items in the United States, 
whether as an American or Frenchman, and thus no title for the objects could be justified.  
However, the French judge specifically pointed out that NAGPRA did not apply internationally. 
 Obviously, this needs to change if the tribes are to be empowered to the degree that seems 
to have been intended by the legislation.  Natives have power to reattain human remains and sacred 
objects from federally-funded institutions in the United States; however they have no power 
whatsoever internationally.  Even in cases which the the title can be found invalid based on 
NAGPRA, the tribes have no means to put pressure on organizations internationally.  In the past, 
the United States government has made country to country deals ensuring items taken illegally from 
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other countries and sold in the United States would be returned to that country.  The United States 
government needs to now do the same for their own people as every day Native human remains and 
sacred items are sold internationally.  
 More recently, a German museum devoted to a creator of the romanticized Wild West, 
writer Karl May, was found to still display Native American scalps in its collection.  To this point, 
the US government has advised the tribes work with the museum directly without US government 
intervention.  As of March 2014, the museum has no interest and is not compelled to return the 
scalps or take them off of display.  It seems clear that this type of human rights abuse is exactly what 
NAGPRA intended to prevent, however the US government has no interest in expanding their 
efforts for justice for their own people internationally. 
 
8. Lack of “Teeth” 
This problem goes hand in hand with number 7.  The government is not invested in 
accomplishing the intent of the law.  It seems as though the law was created and a small budget set 
aside in order for the government to relieve itself from needing to deal with this issue.  However, 
Native remains are still dug up and sold.  In fact, one oil company manager – not knowing who I 
was or what I do – once told me he sells all the Native remains they find when they put in pipelines.  
“You can actually make a pretty penny for a good, whole Indian skull.”  On the other side, museums 
have had little to no incentive to accomplish this work.   
Until the recent CUI regulation, many institutions, including CSU, were non-compliant on 
the basis that they could list all their remains as “culturally unidentifiable” and then did not have to 
make any repatriation or NAGPRA efforts.  Some civil penalties have been issued (Iraola 2003; 
McKeown 2013).  Some grave robbers have been prosecuted (McKeown 2013).  However, there is 
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little to no threat of force behind this legislation and everyone in the NAGPRA world is keenly 
aware of it.  If NAGPRA was meant to empower, it has fallen flat without forcing compliance. 
 
A Law of Good Faith 
 Though there is still yet one last reserved regulation section undeveloped, NAGPRA is a 
deeply flawed law in terms of what it intended.  It is able to accomplish the tangible result of the law 
– the physical repatriation of culturally sensitive materials – but the law falls far short of an 
instrument of empowerment.  Too much of the utilization of the law depends on good faith efforts 
from the people that are genuinely empowered by the process – the museums.  If the museums do 
not like the power they have been given, because they disapprove of repatriation or other reasons, 
they can wield the law in such a way that has become very problematic for the people it was meant 
to help. 
 The failings of NAGPRA begin where all failings of federal Indian law and policy begin, and 
that is Congress.  There is no direct representation of Natives in Congress, despite being sovereign 
nations and Congress’ status as directors of Indian affairs (Echo-Hawk and Trope 2000; Echo-Hawk 
2013).  Legislation generally cannot be accomplished properly for Natives of this country because of 
this basic structure.  Like other laws governing Indian Country, NAGPRA has suffered from being a 
Euro-American law, in Euro-American language, empowering Euro-American institutions to help 
Native peoples.  Genuinely Native-centric legislation would be much more inclusive and 
collaborative with Native peoples and their knowledge structures, and ideally would not even come 
from Congress. 
 There is hope for repatriation in the United States and throughout the world, however.  
Laws like NAGPRA have occurred in many countries that still have a majority population of the 
colonizing people (Feikert and Clarke 2009).  Additionally, repatriation has been addressed by major 
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world organizations, indicating an emerging worldwide consensus on repatriations, as will be shown 
in the next chapter.  What can that consensus tell us?  Where is repatriation headed?  A look at 








 By analyzing legislative and policy trends on repatriation throughout the world we can 
discern the emerging repatriation ethics.  The United States is not the only country that has needed 
to address repatriation.  Colonized countries like Canada, New Zealand, Australia, South Africa and 
others have had a history of colonial oppression that included appropriation of indigenous human 
remains and sacred objects, amongst other things.  When the indigenous peoples of these countries 
did not die out, as many of their colonizers had anticipated, they began to call for the return of their 
heritage and ancestors.  In most cases, the government has needed to respond, although in some 
countries repatriation is a matter of policy rather than law. 
 
Australia 
 Australia has a very similar, though later, colonial history as the United States.  Officially a 
colony of Britain as of 1770, Indigenous population of Australia was near 3,000,000 people on the 
large island prior to the arrival of the British (Ross et al. 2010).  As was the case for Native 
Americans, Indigenous Australians suffered horrifically from the diseases brought with the 
Europeans with an estimated 50% of the population dying of smallpox between 1789 and 1830 
(Ross et al. 2010).  Though indigenous population numbers were not tracked historically, in 2011 
Australian indigenous numbered 548,370 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012), which represented 
about 2.5% of the country’s population – compared to Native Americans representing 1% of the US 
population (U.S. Census Bureau 2013). 
 Human remains were collected in Australia for many of the same reasons as in the United 
States.  In the era of phrenology and Social Darwinism, diverse collections of human remains were 
critical to scientists’ interpretation of perceived racial differences.  In order to accommodate the calls 
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by indigenous Australians to return the human remains of their ancestors, Australia began its Return 
of Indigenous Cultural Property Program in 1996.  This initiative of the Cultural Ministers’ Council 
requires the “major government-funded” museums of Australia to accomplish four objectives: (1) 
identify the origins of human remains and “secret/sacred” objects in their collection (2) notify all 
indigenous communities that may have ancestral remains or objects associated with them in the 
collection (3) store remains or objects in accordance with relevant indigenous community wishes.  
Four, arrange for repatriation when requested (Feikert and Clarke 2009). 
 The operation of this law, which is obviously similar to NAGPRA, has many of the same 
problems that NAGPRA does.  Repatriation requires geographic identities to be determined, a 
process that is difficult and problematic – and is the sole responsibility of the museums (Truscott 
2006).  After identify is determined, indigenous peoples must confirm this determination as proper 
geographic disposition is critical to the peace of the remains in the opinion of most indigenous 
communities.  Similar to NAGPRA, reburial lands are hard to find and their protection is not 
provided for in the initiative.  Additionally, the burden of conducting repatriations, consultations, 
and reburials is on the indigenous communities.  Although there are government funds available for 
communities conducting this work, acquiring those funds may be inherently problematic for some 
communities (Truscott 2006). 
 Similarities in repatriation ethic between the Australian initiative and NAGPRA can be 
found in requiring museums to identify human remains and sacred objects within their collection 
and working to repatriate those items to affiliated, indigenous communities. 
 
New Zealand 
 Across the Tasman Sea from Australia lies another couple of islands that were subjected to 
extreme colonizing during the same era: New Zealand.  When the islands were first settled by the 
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British in the late 18th century, the Maori were engaged in a large-scale war that was only worsened 
by the introduction of guns.  A traditional practice of the Maori at the time was to preserve the 
heads of those killed in battle as an honor to them.  However, when traders living on and visiting the 
island began trading for the heads to have and display as curiosities, a market developed for the 
heads that turned the collection of them from a point of pride to an economic practice of harvesting 
slave heads and those of fallen enemies. 
 The popularity of these heads in curio shops and museums throughout the Western world 
saw them widely collected and dispersed throughout the world.  Fortunately for the local museums, 
human remains were not widely collected within the country itself.  In order to regain the heads of 
the ancestors of the indigenous population of New Zealanders that had left the country, the 
government created the Protected Objects Act in accordance with the UNESCO Convention on the 
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Cultural Property 
(Feikert and Clarke 2009).  This act makes any Maori human remains or artifacts found in the 
country property of the government and in turn provides for the return of the remains to the proper 
iwi or Maori group. 
 In 2003, The Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa) was ordered to spend 
a portion of its federal funding on directing and coordinating the repatriation programs throughout 
the country (Feikert and Clarke 2009).  The program, called the Karanga Aoteroa Repatriation Unit, 
provides for the expenses of boxing and shipping the remains, as well as repatriation representatives’ 
expenses and burial costs.  The program is run by a repatriation team of Maori ancestry and receives 
advice from an all Maori Repatriation Advisory Panel.  The repatriation and reburial process is 
entirely dictated by the iwi receiving the remains and accommodated by Te Papa (Feikert and Clarke 
2009; Te Papa n.d.). 
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 To many people, New Zealand represents the ideal example of collaborative repatriation.  
Maori peoples are empowered to request whatever process they prefer for repatriation or reburial 
without qualification or limitations by the law or administering body.  The text of the policies are 
infused with Maori language, using Maori terms and their definitions as official legal terms rather 
than English terms and definitions for Maori concepts (Te Papa n.d.).  The process is also directed 
and advised by people of Maori ancestry.  To the benefit of the Maori, they represent a 
proportionally high amount of the population (8%) and the country is very small (Feikert and Clarke 
2009).  Not only that, but unlike in the United States, the Maori collectively share many aspects of 
their culture with some local particularities which helps the policy to be more comprehensive 
without compromising any one group’s interests.  Ultimately, New Zealand’s repatriation ethic 
shares the processes of identification and repatriation of identified human remains to the 
appropriate group with the ethics of the United States, Canada, and Australia. 
 
Canada 
 The United States’ neighbor to the north shares a very similar colonial history.  The First 
Peoples of Canada represent just over 4% of the country’s population, with just over 1 million 
people.  Thus the First Peoples represent a much higher percentage than the United States.  
Historically, Canada had better relations with Natives than the United States government.  In fact, 
when Sitting Bull was at war with the United States, he fled across the northern border where he 
knew the Queen’s government would not pursue him. 
 However, repatriation legislation is suspiciously absent in Canada.  There is a general 
governmental policy advocating repatriation, however all institutions are free to dictate their own 
repatriation guidelines, or lack thereof.  This has at times been very problematic and at others been 
successfully collaborative.  However, there are several prominent repatriation policies: 
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1. The Royal Ontario Museum is committed to repatriating human remains for which 
descendency or cultural affinity can be determined (The Royal Ontario Museum 2012). 
2. The Canadian Museum of Civilization and its subsidiaries will repatriate human remains 
and associated funerary objects on the basis of demonstrable links to modern aboriginal 
groups and archaeological objects on the basis of evidence that it was used or would still 
be used by religious practitioners of aboriginal groups (The Canadian Museum of 
Civilization Corporation 2011). 
3.  The First Nations Sacred Ceremonial Objects Repatriation Act and the subsequent First 
Nations Sacred Ceremonial Objects Amendment Act allow for sacred objects that are 
needed to perform modern religious rites to be repatriated to the appropriate First 
Nations group.  This legislation is unique to the province of Alberta. 
The policies of Canada are clear; cultural affiliation is critical to any repatriation claim.  It seems as 
though the institutions themselves, similarly to NAGPRA, are responsible for determining this 
relationship.  Despite the subjectivity of each institution, these policies affirm the repatriation ethic 
that provides for the repatriation of culturally affiliatable human remains and sacred objects needed 
to practice modern traditional religions. 
 
Professional Code of Ethics 
 As demonstrated in Canada, nations and their governments are not the only determiners of 
repatriation ethic.  Organizations, even in nations with comprehensive repatriation laws, create their 
own policies on repatriation.  Many museums and archaeological organizations have been reticent to 
repatriate potentially valuable data and objects to indigenous peoples, who upon receipt often rebury 
or destroy those objects.  However, most of the organizations of colonial power that address 
repatriation in their policies do follow much of the same repatriation ethic established by NAGPRA, 
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the repatriation laws of Australia and New Zealand, as well as the institutional policies in Canada.  
The similarities between nearly all of them are the support for repatriation of culturally affiliatable 
human remains and sacred objects. 
 
Society for American Archaeology 
 Both the SAA and the AAM were very involved in the establishment of NAGPRA.  
Representing professional archaeologists and museum professionals, respectively, the organizations 
took it upon themselves to defend the interests of these professions.  Both organizations 
vehemently opposed establishment of federal repatriation legislation.  Neither wholly reject 
repatriation, however they both thought repatriation should be considered on a case-by-case basis 
(McKeown 2013).  Much of this fear revolved around the popular idea that federal repatriation 
legislation, even if specifically for human remains and sacred objects, would set a precedent that 
would lead to the forced repatriation of all Native American objects from museums.  Ultimately, 
both organizations accepted the fact that repatriation legislation would be established and they 
engaged in discourse with advocates of the law in order to make a compromise to which both sides 
could agree (McKeown 2013).  
The SAA human remains policy takes very seriously what it considers the obligation of 
professional archaeologists as stewards of artifacts and interpreters of the past (Society for American 
Archaeology 1986).  Although the policy opposes NAGPRA and any universalizing repatriation 
legislation, it is open to repatriation in certain circumstances.  Specifically, in cases which the 
individual’s identity can be discerned, the next of kin should hold the rights of control over the 
individual (Society for American Archaeology 1986).  This means repatriation and reburial is the 
kin’s prerogative.  However, in cases which the specific identity cannot be understood, the SAA 
believes that the scientific significance should be weighed against the strength of a cultural affiliation 
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claim from a tribe.  In cases which the remains are not of scientific import and a strong case for 
cultural affiliation can be made to an extant tribe, the SAA seems amenable to repatriation (Society 
for American Archaeology 1986). 
 This policy, coming from one of the most vocal and ardent oppositional organizations to 
NAGPRA, affirms the repatriation ethic that we can see emerging.  Again, cultural affiliation is to be 
determined for human remains and for those that show a shared relationship to the remains should 
have the remains repatriated to them (except in the event that the remains are of significant scientific 
value).   
 
Association of American Museums 
 The AAM was always the quieter of the partners against the repatriation legislation 
(McKeown 2013).  The same largely holds true today.  No generally accessible policy on repatriation 
or human remains can be found on their website, as can be found on many museums’ and cultural 
heritage organizations’ websites.  Only two documents by the AAM could be found that indirectly 
suggest a policy on repatriation or human remains. 
 The first document is a brief on a meeting with Congress regarding the 2010 CUI regulation.  
The brief begins with a summary of NAGPRA which AAM describes gives Natives the “right to 
repatriate” NAGPRA-related materials “when certain criteria are met” (Association of American 
Museums 2013).  This statement itself is indicative of what the AAM hoped NAGPRA to be, a 
legislation that enabled Native Americans to reattain their human remains and cultural patrimony 
when criteria – usually cultural affiliation – are met.  The law itself, as we previously discussed, does 
not necessarily enable to tribes to do so based on criteria.  The burden of proof was specifically 
required of scientific institutions to disprove affiliation, which also implies that the “right to 
repatriate” is inherent and without qualification (Department of the Interior 1990). 
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 However, the AAM brief goes on to criticize the 2010 regulation as outside the scope of 
NAGPRA’s original text and intent.  By claiming the regulation “undercuts the constitutional 
underpinnings” of NAGPRA, the AAM suggests they consider the original law to have been 
intended as a balance between Native and scientific interests (Association of American Museums 
2013).  The AAM also asserts that the 2010 regulation subjects museums to new legal risks on the 
basis of being forced to repatriate remains to tribes that may not be affiliated with them.  Ultimately, 
the AAM opposes the mandate of disposition for culturally unidentifiable individuals and the 
recommended disposition of associated funerary objects (Association of American Museums 2013). 
 In a second document, the Code of Ethics for Curators by the AAM Curators Committee, 
NAGPRA is briefly mentioned (AAM Curators Committee 2009).  The only obligation for curators 
operating under AAM policy is to comply with NAGPRA.  There are no recommendations as to 
how this might be best accomplished nor is there a commitment to the intent of the law.  The 
silence in this section certainly seems to betray a resentful acceptance. 
It is difficult to parse out the AAM’s general repatriation policy based on two documents 
that do not directly address it, however two points from the brief indicate affirmation of our 
repatriation ethic.  First, the brief describes the rewarding processes that NAGPRA has put forth, 
including consultation with Native American tribes (Association of American Museums 2013).  
Describing the process as rewarding falls short of an endorsement for repatriation of culturally 
affiliatable human remains and sacred objects, but if the process has been mutually viewed positive 
then it has likely been done in good faith.  Second, the objection of the AAM was on the basis of 
forcing disposition of culturally unidentifiable individuals.  In combination, these two pieces of 
evidence seem to suggest the AAM has at least some degree of agreement with the repatriation ethic. 
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 Though both the SAA and AAM both campaigned against repatriation legislation in the 
United States, both seem to affirm the repatriation ethic that requires cultural identification of 
human remains and repatriation to the affiliated indigenous groups. 
 
British Museum 
 The British Museum felt the impact of NAGPRA after its enactment.  Though some claims 
had come for repatriations, the largest museum in the UK could not begin its repatriation efforts 
due to its trust obligations to the public and students of the country (Feikert and Clarke 2009).  
However, in 2004 the UK enacted the Human Tissues Act that allowed museums to repatriate 
human remains that were less than 1,000 years old and that could be associated with living peoples.  
This law did not have very strict parameters and repatriation policies from the nine museums 
affected were practically essential (Feikert and Clarke 2009). 
 The British Museum’s policy allows for the repatriation of human remains that are either less 
than 100 years old or that are between 100 and 1,000 years old and can be found to have cultural 
continuity with modern people (The British Museum n.d.).  Artifacts associated with those remains 
that are considered to be indivisible from the remains can also be repatriated.  However, if the 
museum considers the repatriation to be a breach of the public trust, likely meaning they are 
scientifically indispensable, the museum may deny the request for repatriation however strong the 
claim of cultural continuity (as long as the remains are not less than 100 years old) (The British 
Museum n.d.). 
 This again affirms the repatriation ethic that requires the repatriation of culturally affiliatable 
human remains.  The burden of proof is on the claimants for the remains although in keeping with 




German Museums Association Ethical Guidelines 
 Before 2013, there were no organizational or governmental guidelines for human remains or 
sacred objects in Germany, despite its former standing as a colonial power.  In fact there were no 
proven means of using the legal system to enforce repatriation of human remains that were not still 
being grieved for, including known, named individuals (Deterts 2013). 
 In an attempt to provide guidance for organizations potentially in possession of human 
remains in Germany, the German Museums Association published the Recommendations for the 
Care of Human Remains in Museums and Collections.  An extensive and well-researched treatise, 
the Recommendations find that museums should create standardized and comprehensive 
inventories of their human remains to be made publically available (Deterts 2013).  For those human 
remains that can be culturally affiliated to a group that no longer exists as a result of injustice, they 
should be buried immediately.  Remains can be determined to be associated with modern peoples if 
the remains can be identified as a person having lived in the last 125 years or if there is a 
demonstrated geographical, religious, spiritual, and/or cultural connection.  If this can be 
determined, the course of action, potentially including repatriation, should be negotiated between 
the stakeholders (Deterts 2013).   
In regard to the study of human remains, scientific investigations should only be conducted 
on remains with very significant scientific potential that clearly are not associated with any form of 
injustice (Deterts 2013).  If the remains belong to a group as a result of injustice, the remains are to 
be consulted on with that group and their approval is required prior their study.  In the event that 
affiliation cannot be determined, scientific study should not be conducted in part due to deference 




Again, for the German Museums Association as with all the other organizations and nations 
analyzed in this paper, cultural association remain critical in the validity of a repatriation claim.  The 
GMA Recommendations are also compelling for their depth of consideration for all other types of 
human remains.  In Germany, where a central principle of law is the protection of human dignity 
(Deterts 2013), much of their advice considers what might be assuring human dignity for every 
individual represented in museum collections.  They do consider it a professional obligation of 
museums as scientific institutions to study remains when ethical, however the GMA places priority 
with the concept of human dignity and the abstention from studying remains.  To them, human 
dignity is a fundamental right whereas scientific study is a professional right. 
 
International Organizations 
 The scope of repatriation ethics is not specifically national.  International organizations have 
come to agreements on cultural materials and property, as in the case of the UNESCO Convention 
of 1970.  These agreements and organizational codes represent large numbers of people, institutions, 
and countries so the policies become notably milder.  However the repatriation ethic is still 
addressed by some international groups, signaling a strong degree of international consensus on the 
issue. 
 
ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums 
 In representing over 20,000 museums in 236 countries, the International Council of 
Museums has had to take a broad approach in creating their code of ethics (ICOM: The World 
Museum Community 2014).  The variation in types of museums and cultural ideologies render this 
code of ethics document more general than at the Denver Museum of Nature & Science or even for 
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the German Museums Association.  In this way, the document is rather benign and conservative 
although it does include advice on repatriation. 
 In addition to very general provisions on museum best practices, the ICOM code of ethics 
provides for the return of culturally sensitive materials, including human remains, to groups related 
to the materials (International Council of Museums 2013).  Again, this affirms the repatriation ethic 
but it also signals a trend in ethics.  As the geographic scope broadens, the repatriation ethics place 
less responsibility on the institutions themselves and more on the people claiming the remains.  For 
Te Papa in New Zealand, the museum is responsible for all repatriation efforts in concert with the 
iwi.  A little larger, but still just a national effort, NAGPRA places the responsibility of inventories 
on the museums and the repatriation claims on the tribes.  Even larger, the ICOM code of ethics 
does require good inventories, but leave all aspects, including the burden of proof, on the claimant 
groups trying to reattain the human remains or sacred objects (International Council of Museums 
2013).  However, all of the policies include provisions for repatriation of culturally affiliated human 
remains and sacred objects. 
 
UN Declaration on the Rights for Indigenous Peoples 
 The UN Declaration of Rights for Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was the result of 25 years’ 
of work (Echo-Hawk 29-32).  Inspired by the civil rights movements throughout the world in the 
1970’s, the United Nations investigations into the status of indigenous peoples’ rights yielded the 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) in 1982.  This group created UN Convention 
Number 169 which sought to defend indigenous peoples from discrimination and suggested some 
degree of self-determination for indigenous peoples (UN Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations 1989).  The document was only signed by 20 countries, as even as this convention was 
68 
 
being promulgated, the WGIP was drafting what would eventually become the Declaration of Rights 
for Indigenous Peoples (Echo-Hawk 29-32). 
The drafting of the document began in 1985 and the first draft was finished and considered 
in 1993 (Echo-Hawk 31-32).  This draft was then forwarded to the Commission on Human Rights 
where it was debated and changed over a 13 year period.  Finally in 2006, the amended document 
was revised one last time according to some final requests from African representatives.  On 
September 13, 2007, the document was approved by 144 countries, with only 4 dissentions and 11 
abstentions (Echo-Hawk 32).  Of course, the four dissentions came from colonial nations, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.  However, all four of these nations, including two 
previously abstaining countries have since supported the document, meaning all 150 members that 
voted on the document have approved it (Echo-Hawk 32). 
Of the 46 articles, Article 12 explicitly mentions repatriation. 
“Article 12 
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practice, develop and teach their spiritual 
and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect, and have 
access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the right to the use and control of 
their ceremonial objects; and the right to the repatriation of their human remains. 
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial objects and 
human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and effective mechanisms 
developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.” (Assembly 2007) 
 
This explicitly affirms the repatriation ethic concerning affiliated human remains and sacred objects.  
Not only does it demonstrate that this ethic is shared at an individual institution level, national level, 
and international level, but it points to this ethic as a result of a human right.  By doing so, the UN  
went beyond making this a matter of ethics – what a country, people, or profession should consider 






Repatriation as a Human Right 
In the Congressional dialogue concerning the creation of NAGPRA, the terms “rights” and 
“human rights” were used on several occasions suggesting that this was the basis of its tenets 
(McKeown 2012).  Additionally, many scholars that study NAGPRA and its application point to it 
as an example of “human rights law” (Biggs 2011; Birkhold 2011; Echo-Hawk and Trope 2000; 
Hanna 2003; Hemenway, Henry, and Holt 2012; Luby and Nelson 2008; Niesel 2011; Nilsson Stutz 
2005; Ousley, Billeck, and Hollinger 2005; Riley 2002; Watkins 2004).  Equating repatriation of 
human remains and sacred objects was not unique to UNDRIP even though the term cannot be 
found in the legislations, policies, or ethical codes of any groups addressing the issue.  The concept 
has been controversial and political and for good reason.  The establishment of a human right has 
significant and lasting effects.   
Before we consider repatriation as a right, or possibly even a human right, we must first 
establish how the concept of a “right” has been constructed.  The definition of a right is an 
inalienable entitlement that can apply at a professional, national, or international level.  Although the 
concept of rights originated in Classical Philosophy, it was during the Enlightenment that rights 
were initially defined by those that could be considered as legal rights versus those that were natural 
rights.  Philosopher John Locke popularized the concept – subsequently appropriated by the 
founding fathers of the United States – that people had a “right” to life and liberty.  Philosopher 
Immanual Kant then extended this concept with his deontological principle (Alexander and Moore 
2012).   
The development of “rights” and “human rights” has a long tradition grounded in Western 
philosophy.  In this way, the concept is a construct of Western, secular scientism.  The application 
of scientism on indigenous epistemologies devalues both internally and externally the unique 
knowledge system and its priorities.  However, insofar that human rights as a concept have afforded 
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indigenous peoples protections from oppressive domestic power structures, they have been 
popularly used by many native peoples.  This dynamic creates an interesting catch-22: indigenous 
people’s epistemologies are devalued and deconstructed by the necessity of using human rights as a 
tool of justice. 
A human right is differentiated from a right in that it is by definition universal to all people4.  
A right may be a legal right – you may be entitled to a lawyer prior to speaking to prosecution.  A 
right may be a professional right – as the primary investigator of an archaeological site, you may be 
entitled to all data and artifacts found at a site.  However, a human right is an inalienable and 
universal entitlement that applies to all people in all cases. 
The concept of human rights is also differentiated from the concept of indigenous rights on 
the basis that indigenous rights are specific to what can be considered indigenous peoples.  This 
does include human rights, as those apply to indigenous people as well, however indigenous rights 
concern issues that do not apply to people that are not of indigenous communities, such as land 
rights, right of self-determination, and language rights.   
This special rights status has been the subject of much confusion and controversy from 
those that feel indigenous peoples are not entitled to any additional rights beyond normalized 
human rights (Echo-Hawk 130-131; Hutt and McKeown 1999).  However, it is important to note 
that indigenous rights are still human rights.  Their lack of universal applicability to non-indigenous 
populations does not make them special rights.  They are rights to which all people are originally 
entitled, however these rights are only required for populations that are colonized in order to 
provide for the human right of cultural survival. 
 Human rights can be established in a number of ways.  All require the normalization of that 
right in customary international law and normalization within the public sphere.  Establishment of a 
                                                 
4
 The universality of human rights has been subject to much debate, see also David Kennedy’s The International 
Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? Harvard Human Rights Journal / Vol. 15, Spring 2002 
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right is not the creation of a right, but a normalized realization of that right.  They have emerged as a 
result of activism, as in the case of the civil rights movement in the United States.  They have 
emerged as a result of governmental proclamation, as in the Declaration of Independence5.  They 
have been set by collaborative and international documents, such as the UN Declaration of Human 
Rights established in 1948. 
In each of the cases outlined above, a precedent was set prior to the realization of those 
rights.  Precedents indicating a trajectory toward the realization of civil rights for African Americans 
in the United States were established by the abolition of slavery, the work of Frederick Douglas, and 
the voting rights of women and Native Americans.  Precedent for the Declaration of Independence 
was set by John Locke’s works and the French revolution.  Precedent for the UN Declaration came 
in the form of the reaction to atrocities committed in World War II, as well as the eugenics 
movements prior.   
The precedents are obviously easy to interpret in retrospect; however it is not difficult to 
discern modern day precedents for emerging human rights.  Rights for homosexuals, especially 
spousal rights, are obviously on this trajectory.  At this point, their rights are still not normalized, but 
the precedent has been set by activism and human rights organizations.  These rights can be 
determined to be basic human rights for a group that is currently being denied them.  In this way, 
homosexual spousal rights can be considered to be on the human rights recognition trajectory. 
I assert that repatriation of human remains and sacred objects to affiliated indigenous 
peoples is also currently on this trajectory toward normalization.  Precedent has been established at a 
local, national, and international level.  Resistance still occurs from organizations that find value or 
power in these objects.  In my experience, archaeologists, biological anthropologists, and museum 
                                                 
5
 “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” – Declaration of 
Independence, 1776 – taken from http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html 
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professionals that work with artifacts are more likely to not favor repatriation than to favor it.  This 
may not be true of the United States at large; however there are very many people that actively 
oppose repatriation. 
However, a clear international ethic has emerged on repatriation.  This consensus and the 
establishment of repatriation as a “right” in the UNDRIP are the precedents that indicate 
repatriation is on the human rights trajectory.  This means that when the right is normalized, there 
will be no debate about its merits.  Those institutions, such as can be found in the United States, that 
have deliberately contradicted the tenets of this repatriation right will be seen on the wrong side of 
history.  These institutions should comply with the current ethical trajectory in order to save prevent 
what could be perceived as the perpetration of human rights abuses in the 21st century. 
 
Situating NAGPRA in the Trajectory 
 It is important to point out that although this repatriation right is being realized by 
NAGPRA and its application in the United States, the repatriation right is much narrower than the 
breadth of NAGPRA.  The repatriation right applies to affiliatable human remains and sacred 
objects.  NAGPRA additionally deals with funerary objects and objects of cultural patrimony (which 
debatably could be considered “sacred objects”).  Not only that, but the 2010 regulation also gives 
NAGPRA the power to require disposition of unidentifiable human remains.  This clearly is outside 
the repatriation ethic of every other repatriation policy in this study.  This discrepancy certainly 
deserves a deeper look. 
 The most obvious reason why the repatriation right would not include culturally 
unidentifiable human remains would be the inability of museums to discern whether or not the 
remains are from indigenous populations.  It also should be noted that human remains that could 
generally be affiliated to the Maori, without the ability to be associated with a specific iwi, are 
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required to be returned to Te Papa regardless (Te Papa n.d.).  Additionally, cultural affiliating 
remains to Native Hawaiians is relatively easy due to the fact that there were no tribal divisions, per 
se (Greer 2012; Greer 2013).  However, culturally affiliating Native American remains to one of the 
566 federally recognized tribes in the United States is a very difficult task.   
In this way, culturally unidentifiable remains are still definitively Native American – or 
should be – and in that case they still fall largely under the umbrella of the intent of the repatriation 
ethic.  If we consider the rationale for the German Museums Association, all remains that were 
taken in the context of injustice should be considered for repatriation.  Additionally, the UNDRIP 
describes the right of “Indigenous peoples…to the repatriation of their human remains” (Assembly 
2007).  Within these loose parameters, identifying remains as Native American would justify the 
repatriation of culturally unidentifiable individuals in most cases, as they are both of indigenous 









 Clearly a strong repatriation ethic providing for the return of culturally affiliated human 
remains and sacred objects has emerged in the United States and throughout the world.  Based on 
consensus and precedent, indications are that this ethic will be cemented as a human right at some 
point in the future.  This should help museums, organizations, and governments to guide their own 
policies on repatriation.  For those few that have not supported this ethic, it is clear that 
contradicting the ethic will be seen as human rights abuse only prolonging the oppressive 
colonialism that should be resigned to the past. 
 NAGPRA as a manifestation of this ethic provides tools for Native peoples in the United 
States to realize their repatriation right.  However, it falls short of the empowerment it was likely 
intended to address.  Significant issues remain in how the law operates and what it requires of the 
stakeholders.  Though NAGPRA served as a model for repatriation policy the world over, the law 
suffers from having been fought for and passed during an era it was difficult to justify indigenous 
rights.  Otherwise the law may have been better considered for all stakeholders. 
 A terrific example of a truly collaborative repatriation law policy can be found in New 
Zealand where the Maori are genuinely empowered to participate in the repatriation process.  People 
of Maori ancestry direct the national repatriation program.  An advisory council of Maori peoples 
oversees the action of the program.  And the iwi are empowered to make any requests within reason 
that the Te Papa will accommodate to ensure proper repatriation and reburial of remains.  Not only 
that, but the program in New Zealand endeavors internationally to return remains home.  The 
United States makes no international efforts on behalf of Natives for these materials and will not 
respond to calls to action from its own people. 
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 However, there are several more countries and organizations that are far behind NAGPRA.  
In Canada, though there has been better collaboration in this repatriation era between the First 
Peoples and museums than in many former colonial nations, the lack of national direction on 
repatriation is bewildering.  Clearly, First Nation people of Canada’s rights to their human remains 
and sacred objects are not normalized nor nationally supported.  Other nations like Australia and the 
United Kingdom have laws that assist repatriation efforts, however in my opinion they fall short of 
empowerment as well. 
 Despite the focus on dissemination of power in NAGPRA, the repatriation ethic that is 
affirmed by so many professional and group ethics throughout the world does not concern itself 
with empowerment.  This international repatriation ethic, and the tentative repatriation right, 
provide for the accommodation of repatriation requests based on solid evidence.  There is no strong 
consensus on whom the burden of proof should be in this process.  Accordingly, NAGPRA does in 
fact conform to the international repatriation ethic in that it accommodates repatriation without 
empowering indigenous communities.  It should be said, though, that this is certainly not the “spirit” 
of NAGPRA or the repatriation ethic in general.  As detailed in the UN Declaration of Rights for 
Indigenous Peoples, the rights of self-determination, cultural survival, and religious freedoms should 
all be afforded indigenous peoples of the world.  If NAGPRA were to meet these standards at the 
highest level, the application and form of the law would certainly be more sympathetic to Native 








 By 2064, the majority of human remains in contemporary collections will have been 
repatriated and reburied in the United States.  The fear that scientists had been so consumed with 
during the development of NAGPRA will have been realized.  As seen by the numbers provided by 
National NAGPRA, the majority of inventoried remains have not yet been repatriated and it will 
probably take all of the next 50 years before the majority of the remains are repatriated or 
dispositioned.  It is difficult to overstate how severely the legislators, and even the museum 
professionals themselves, underestimated the amount of time needed to gain compliance with 
NAGPRA. 
 Despite the relative success of this program, people of the future will have a different view 
of NAGPRA and whether or not it was successful.  In the current climate, there is still significant 
fervor for and resistance against the right to repatriation and reburial.  However, the future will be 
more distanced from this debate.  The repatriation right will be much closer to normalization.  
Repatriation programs throughout the world will have given back the majority of indigenous 
collections. 
 From this standpoint, there will be significant criticisms of NAGPRA.  Did it go beyond the 
repatriation right?  Are tribes of the future at all put off by their ability in the past to have 
participated in the repatriation era?  Are tribes of the future any more concerned with allowing 
better techniques to develop that could help determine cultural affiliation for previously 
unidentifiable individuals?  No doubt archaeologists, and maybe especially Native archaeologists 
themselves, will run into problems with the fact that databases of reburial locations were not 




 However, NAGPRA and the repatriation affirming policies throughout the world will have 
inspired more and better collaboration between indigenous peoples and scientists.  By including 
Natives in the disposition of their own heritage and remains, NAGPRA will have served as an 
instrument of equilibrium.  Prior to the law, scientists and their institutions had a disproportionate 
amount of power over Native remains and objects.  Through NAGPRA, Natives were empowered, 
albeit inefficiently, to assert control.  Many scientists argued that perhaps more power was given to 
Natives than should have been to maintain a balance between scientific and Native interests in these 
materials.  However, this “over-empowerment” will only benefit scientists of the future by removing 
so many of the apprehensions and inhibitions Native people had about scientists for so long.  When 
scientists no longer have a disproportionate amount of power over Native people, Native people 
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